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CONSUMERS DECLININ POWER IN T E
FINTEC AUTO LOAN MARKET
Pamela Foohey*
A STRACT
Automobiles have become part of America’s infrastructure. For most
people, having access to a car is crucial to their livelihoods and they will
take on significant amounts of debt to purchase vehicles. Auto debt is unlike
any other consumer debt, both in its structure, which allows creditors to
easily seize collateral, and in its lack of regulation. The unique and lucrative
nature of auto debt has not gone unnoticed by lenders or by companies
leveraging fintech to offer people new ways to purchase cars and car loans.
This Article assesses the evolving marketplace for auto sales, leasing, and
loans to evaluate how Americans access cars, including consumer
bankruptcy’s place in helping people keep their cars. Based on this
assessment, it argues that power imbalances between auto lenders and
consumers have widened and likely will continue to widen, to people’s
detriment. The Article ends by outlining and evaluating a series of ideas to
facilitate needed “car security” for Americans.
INTRODUCTION: DRI IN

IN AMERICA
1

America is a country of cars. Having access to an automobile is crucial
to getting to work, to the grocery store, to the doctor, to school, and to
childcare.2 In most places in the United States, infrastructure prevents even
moderately efficient travel without a car. Buses run sporadically. Bike lanes
are nonexistent. Trains and light rails are not accessible. Walking and other
non-car travel simply is not prioritized.3

* Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. This Article was prepared for
the Consumer Welfare, Market Structure and Political Power symposium, hosted by Brooklyn Law
School and the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Corporate Law. My thanks to Edward
Janger for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and to Christopher Bradley, Anne Fleming,
Lynn LoPucki, Christopher Odinet, and Frank Pasquale for comments on the draft.
1. In 2015, the United States was the fourth highest among countries based on motor vehicles
per 1,000 inhabitants. See Joe Myers, These Are the Countries with the Most Vehicles Per Person,
WORLD ECON. FORUM (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/these-are-thecountries-with-the-most-vehicles-per-person/.
2. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, & Deborah Thorne, Driven to Bankruptcy, 55
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 289–90 (2020).
3. See Gregory H. Shill, Unsafe Streets’ New Liability, 2 VISION ZERO CITIES 37 (2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2961099 (detailing a case in New York City in which a twelve-year-old
was struck and severely injured by a car on what was deemed an unsafe street). See generally
Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 502 (2020) (overviewing
how the United States became car-dependent because of legal and governmental choice to invest in
“car-centrism” and “automobile supremacy”); R. J. CROSS ET AL., DRIVING INTO DEBT 4 (2019),
https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/WEB_USP_Driving-into-debt_Report_021219-v2.pdf
(“Auto dependence is the result of generations of public policy.”).
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Most people will take on significant amounts of debt to purchase the
vehicles they need to survive day-to-day, a reality that has not gone unnoticed
by auto dealers and by companies leveraging financial technology (called
“fintech”) to offer people new ways to purchase cars and obtain car loans.4
This Article details the evolving fintech market for auto sales, leasing, and
loans to argue that unless the government steps in to support people in the
new “car economy” that its accumulated policies have shaped, new
innovations will continue to widen power imbalances between auto lenders
and consumers to consumers’ detriment.
Although some people choose to live without a car, most car-free
Americans go without an automobile not by choice but because they cannot
afford a car. 5 Over 85% of Americans drive to work and over 95% of
American households report having access to at least one automobile.6 The
effect of not having access to an automobile is pronounced. Car-less people
in America have lower incomes, work fewer hours, and are more likely to
live in poverty.7
The United States’ choice to build infrastructure and enact laws that
support private investment in cars means that people themselves must invest
in cars, which has led to a robust market for cars and auto loans. Besides a
house, a car is the single biggest investment that most people will make.8
Additionally, two-adult families generally own two cars because most
couples need a car each, particularly if both partners are in the workforce.9
Cars are expensive, even if people purchase them used. Given that nearly
40% of Americans cannot cover a $400 emergency expense with cash,
savings, or a credit card paid off within a month,10 and that over 75% of
4. See generally Christopher Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L.
REV. 781, 784, 787–88 (2018) (defining and discussing “fintech”); Rory Van Loo, Making
Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 238–40 (2018) (same).
5. See Anne E. Brown, Car-Less or Car-Free? Socioeconomic and Mobility Differences
Among Zero-Car Households, 60 TRANSP. POL’Y 152, 154 tbl.1 (2017); Suman K. Mitra & JeanDaniel M. Saphores, Carless in California: Green Choice or Misery?, 65 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY
152, 153 (2017).
6. See Adam Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses,
108 GEO. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2020) (reporting data from the United States Census Bureau).
7. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 289–90. See generally David A. King, Michael J.
Smart & Michael Manville, The Poverty of the Carless: Toward Universal Auto Access, J. PLAN.
EDUC. & RESEARCH (2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X18823252; Steven Raphael & Lorien
Rice, Car Ownership, Employment & Earnings, 52 J. URB. ECON. 109 (2002).
8. See Cross et al., supra note 3, at 4–5; Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 289–290.
9. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 308 tbl.1 (noting that the median number of cars
owned by couples, per the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, is two); see also Phil
LeBeau, Wave Goodbye To The Two-Car Family, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/
2014/11/18/two-car-homes-will-become-less-common-kpmg.html (noting that the majority of
American households own two cars).
10. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYSTEM, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 2 (May 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201905.pdf; see also Pamela Foohey, Dalié
Jiménez, & Christopher K. Odinet, The Folly of Credit as Pandemic Relief, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISC.
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American workers live paycheck-to-paycheck,11 most people must take out
loans to purchase their cars. 12 As income and wealth inequality expands,
people’s need to finance their cars will only increase.13 Indeed, auto loans
now are the second largest consumer credit market in terms of number of
loans 14 and feature prominently on households’ “accumulated ledger of
economic risk.”15 Over the last decade, Americans’ auto loan debt increased
nearly 40% and the average auto loan for a new car increased 11%.16 The
subprime auto loan market has significantly expanded as well.17
More debt could mean more cars. Yet, a significant rise in passenger
vehicles on America’s roads has not accompanied this rise in auto debt. The
total vehicle count has increased by about 10% since 2005.18 In contrast, the
average age of passenger vehicles has risen. At the end of 2018, the average
age of passenger vehicles in operation was 11.8 years; in 2014, it was 11.4
years. 19 These figures suggest that people are taking out more money to
finance increasingly old cars.20

126, 136 (2020) (noting a study from March 2020 that “found that more than half of all individuals
do not have savings to cover three months of expenses”).
11. Emmie Martin, The Government Shutdown Spotlights a Bigger Issue: 78% of US Workers
Live Paycheck to Paycheck, CNBC (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/09/shutdownhighlights-that-4-in-5-us-workers-livepaycheck-to-paycheck.html.
12. See Automobile Purchase Decisions and Auto Lending, FED. RES. BOARD (June 14, 2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/2016-economic-well-being-of-us-households-in2015-Automobile-Purchase-Decisions-and-Auto-Lending.htm (reporting that in 2015, two-thirds of
people who purchased automobiles, new or used, financed their purchase with a loan).
13. See Pamela Foohey & Nathalie Martin, Reducing the Wealth Gap Through Fintech
“Advances” in Consumer Banking and Lending, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV., Part II (forthcoming 2021)
(detailing widening income and wealth gaps in the United States).
14. See Levitin, supra note 6, at n.11 (reporting data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York).
15. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Ken Brown & Shane Shifflett, Families Go Deep in Debt to Stay in
the Middle Class, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/familiesgo-deep-in-debt-to-stay-in-the-middle-class-11564673734.
16. Both figures are inflation adjusted. See id.
17. See FED. RES. BANK OF NY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT
2018: Q4 (Feb. 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/
data/pdf/hhdc_2018q4.pdf (reporting that in 2018, 31% of new auto loan originations went to
borrowers with subprime (below 660) credit scores); infra Part II for more details about auto loans
outstanding.
18. Compare Jerry Hirsch, Record 278 Million Vehicles on U.S. Roads and They are Old,
TRUCKS (June 27, 2019), https://www.trucks.com/2019/06/27/vehicle-average-age-ihs-markit/
(reporting data from the IHS Markit study of vehicle registrations at the beginning of 2019) with
Jerry Hirsch, 253 Million Cars and Trucks on U.S. Roads; Average Age Is 11.4 Years, L.A. TIMES
(June 9, 2014, 8:46 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-ihs-automotive-average
-age-car-20140609-story.html (reporting data from the IHS Markit study of vehicle registrations
from 2004).
19. See Hirsch, Record 278 Million Vehicles, supra note 18 (providing data for “light vehicles”
in operation); Hirsch, 253 Million Cars and Trucks, supra note 18 (same).
20. Cf. David Muller, 5 Used-Vehicle Trends in 2020, AUTO. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2019, 12:00 AM),
https://www.autonews.com/used-cars/5-used-vehicle-trends-2020 (commenting that “dealerships
big and small increasingly have shifted their focus toward used vehicles”).
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How people finance their purchase of vehicles sets auto loans apart from
most other consumer credit, such as credit cards and home loans, which, in
part, may explain increasing loan amounts in relation to the car count. Auto
lenders, like home mortgage lenders, almost always require that borrowers
give rights to their lenders in the cars—that is, the loans are secured. This
security provides lenders the right to repossess and sell vehicles if borrowers
default.21 But unlike home loans, repossessions and sales of automobiles can
happen quickly because there are few federal or state regulations that provide
people with rights against lenders that may delay sales.22 The secured nature
of auto loans suggests that lenders would have significant power to compel
payment because default could immediately threaten a person’s livelihood.
In addition, auto sellers, which often partner with auto lenders or are one in
the same, are not subject to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB)’s rulemaking, supervision, or enforcement authority.23 This carveout
serves to insulate auto loans from regulation by the federal agency designed
to address problematic practices that research had identified in the a variety
of consumer lending markets, including auto loans.24
In accordance with this assumption, research shows that when people
face financial struggles, they generally prioritize paying their auto loans and
default on other debts first.25 During the 2008 financial crisis, for instance,
people continued to make car payments. 26 In contrast, the COVID-19
pandemic may lead to increased auto loan defaults. More people are working

21. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 300–03 (discussing repossession and sale);
Vehicle Repossession, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0144-vehiclerepossession (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (same).
22. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 569 (explaining that “[f]oreclosure is an undesirable outcome
for borrowers and lenders” (emphasis in original)); Vehicle Repossession, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0144-vehicle-repossession (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (“In
many states, your creditor can seize your vehicle as soon as you default on your loan or lease.”);
infra Part III (discussing repossession). Some states give borrowers a short time period to reinstate
after repossession, including for auto loans. See My Car Has Been Repossessed, and I Was Told It
Will Be Sold. What Can I Do?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/my-car-has-been-repossessed-and-i-was-told-it-will-be-sold-whatcan-i-do-en-865/.
23. See Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby, Consumer Protection After the Global
Financial Crisis, 107 Geo. L.J. 813, 824–30 (2019) (discussing the lobbying that led to this carveout
and the intertwining of car sales and loans); infra Part I.A.
24. See Balleisen & Jacoby, supra note 23, at 818–19 (discussing the creation of the CFPB).
25. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 324 (noting that people who file bankruptcy own
cars in the same percentage as American households overall); Laura Bliss, If the Economy Is So
Great, Why Are Car Loan Defaults at a Record High?, CITYLAB (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/02/subprime-car-loans-buy-automobile-lendingdebt-trap/582652/.
26. See Billy Nauman, Why America’s $1.3tn Car-Loan Market Cannot Avoid A Pile-Up, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/5a8ca5b1-9a1c-4f81-99a5-acecef75b389; Kevin
Wack, How the coronavirus is upending auto lending, AM. BANKER (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/how-the-coronavirus-crisis-is-upending-auto-lending.
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from home, which reduces the need for cars to get to work, in turn reducing
the urgency of paying auto loans.27
In non-pandemic times, one of auto lenders’ primary tools to increase
profits is repossession. Some lenders repossess and sell the same used car
repeatedly.28 Car dealers encouraging people to default on their loans and
allow their lenders to repossess their car before they purchase another vehicle
even has a name, “kicking the trade.”29 This practice benefits dealers because
third party lenders are on the hook for the auto loan, not the car dealership,
and the dealership can often make additional money from selling the
customer another car and arranging new financing for that car.30
“Kicking the trade” also reflects the consequence of the recent boom in
auto loans. With debt comes default. As Americans have financed their car
ownership with increasing levels of debt, delinquencies and default have
risen.31 For example, one subprime auto lender stated that, of the cars it lends
against, it expects to repossess 35% of them.32 Even before the COVID-19
pandemic, in 2019, consumers with subprime auto loans were defaulting
within the first few months of borrowing at rates rivaling those during the
2008 financial crisis. 33 And yet subprime auto lenders continued to make
large profits. 34
Overall, the structure of auto sales and lending markets allocates more
power to dealers and lenders than to consumers, likely more so than in other

27. See Nauman, supra note 26; Wack, supra note 26.
28. See Dealers’ Repeated Sales of the Same Used Car Surprisingly Common, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
15, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2012-aug-15-la-fi-boomerangcars-20120815-story.html.
29. See Sebastian Blanco, Some Dealers Telling Customers to Stop Paying Auto Loans, Sign for
New Ones, CAR & DRIVER (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a31055930/cardealers-encouraging-loan-defaults/; AnnaMaria Andriotis & Ben Eisen, Dealerships Give Car
Buyers Some Advice: Just Stop Paying Your Loan, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2020, 5:30
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/dealerships-give-car-buyers-some-advice-just-stop-payingyour-loan-11581762601.
30. See Andriotis & Eisen, supra note 29; infra Part II.A.
31. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 291–92 (discussing delinquencies); Elisabeth
Buchwald, Outstanding Auto-Loan Balances Just Hit a New Record and Delinquencies Are on the
Rise—Should You Be Concerned?, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 25, 2020, 2:18 PM), https://www.market
watch.com/story/outstanding-auto-loan-balances-just-hit-a-new-record-and-delinquencies-are-onthe-rise-should-you-be-concerned-2020-02-21 (noting that auto loans delinquent for 90 or more
days rose from $57 billion to $66 billion between the fourth quarter of 2018 to the fourth quarter of
2019).
32. Ryan Felton, This Subprime Auto Lender Repos 35 Percent of the Cars It Finances,
JALOPNIK (Feb. 9, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://jalopnik.com/this-subprime-auto-lender-repos-35percent-of-the-cars-1822875696.
33. See Adam Tempkin, Subprime Auto Giant’s Loans Souring at Fastest Clip Since 2008,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-1025/subprime-auto-giant-s-loans-souring-at-fastest-clip-since-2008; infra note 157 (noting rises in
delinquencies on subprime auto loans).
34. See Anjali Kamat, The Big Business of Subprime Auto Loans, NPR (Dec. 12, 2019, 5:00
AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/12/787337997/the-big-business-of-subprime-auto-loans.
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consumer credit contexts.35 Indeed, as Adam Levitin recently concluded after
a detailed discussion of auto lending, “the car loan market is rife with
consumer abuses.”36
The car loan market also is rife with new ways to get cars to people.
People’s need for automobiles, coupled with the rise of a lucrative auto loan
market, has spurred innovation in the delivery of auto loans to consumers and
innovation, beyond traditional leases, in how people access cars without
purchasing them.37 Fintech consumer loan platforms and smartphone apps
have gained traction in the past couple years.38 Auto loan platforms and apps
promise to immediately deliver auto loans to customers with reduced fees
and better terms.39
At the same time, ride-sharing services, such as Uber and Lyft, have
transformed how people travel shorter distances, creating gig economy
employment opportunities40 People who drive for these services necessarily
need cars, which, for some, require the purchase or lease of vehicles. Uber
and other companies have tried to capitalize on drivers’ need for financing
for those vehicle purchases. 41 Some of these programs have failed rather
epically, such as Uber’s Xchange Uber Car Financing, which ended in a $20
million settlement with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) based on the
FTC’s assertions of deceptive advertising.42
Also trying to capitalize on people’s shorter-term need for vehicles are
new peer-to-peer car rentals and car-sharing services. These companies offer
an alternative to people who frequently use ride-sharing and also complement

35. A similar consumer credit market is for payday loans and high-cost credit products. Research
shows that people will accept whatever terms they are given because they need money desperately.
See infra Part II.A; Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at Part III.C (discussing alternative financing).
36. See generally Levitin, supra note 6.
37. Auto leasing, while on the rise, remains a small percentage of the market for how people
finance cars. See Aaron M. Kessler, Auto Leasing Gains Popularity Among American Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/business/auto-leasing-gainspopularity-among-american-consumers.html (reporting that about 25% of new vehicles were leased
in 2015).
38. See Kristin Johnson et al., Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance:
Toward Responsible Lending, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 499-502 (2019) (detailing fintech and
finance).
39. See Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at 38 (discussing fintech auto lending platforms).
40. See Miriam A. Cherry, Are Uber and Transportation Network Companies The Future of
Transportation (Law) and Employment (Law)?, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 173, 174–77 (2016)
(overviewing the emergence of vehicle sharing); Shui-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be
Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 990–91, 999, 1003 (2016) (noting the sharing economy
“enable[s] owners of homes, apartments, or vehicles, . . . to monetize those assets”).
41. See Veena Dubal, Opinion, Uber’s New Loan Program Could Trap Drivers in Cycles of
Crushing Debt, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2019/dec/05/uber-loan-program-debt; Brett Helling, Vehicle Financing Options for Rideshare
Drivers, RIDESTER (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.ridester.com/vehicle-financing-options-ridesharedrivers/ (listing ways that ride-sharing drivers can acquire SUVs and luxury cars).
42. See Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at 39–40 (discussing Uber’s failed auto loan program);
infra Part III (detailing more about auto loan defaults and lending program failures).
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already existing vehicle-sharing options, such as ZipCar.43 Piggybacking on
the rise of vehicle sharing services, platforms also have emerged to help users
choose between these services.44 In aggregate, vehicle-sharing services seem
to have increased rather than decreased America’s perceived need for and
consumption of vehicles.45
The introduction of these fintech innovations has the power to disrupt the
existing market structure that allocates power to auto dealers and lenders at
the expense of consumers or to strengthen providers’ hold over consumers.
As the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic continues, people
may gravitate to these innovations as ways to buy the cars they need to get to
work and for other necessary travel. Auto dealers and lenders likewise might
gravitate to these innovations because they allow easier adaptation to
marketplace changes as the crisis evolves. 46 These dynamics hold the
potential to shift the balance of power even more in favor of auto dealers and
lenders if fintech innovations tend to strengthen providers’ hold over
consumers.
Part I of this Article provides more details about auto loans’ growth in
recent decades and then focuses on the newest innovations in auto lending,
paying particular attention to emerging fintech auto loan platforms and
lending programs. This Part shows how the market structure for auto loans
strongly favors lenders to the detriment of consumers’ welfare. Part II
bolsters that conclusion by detailing how the outsized power of auto lenders
continues through delinquency and default.

43. See Oei & Ring, supra note 40, at 1004–05 (discussing peer-to-peer car rentals); What is
Fair and How Does It Work, FAIR, https://fairapp.force.com/s/article/fair-explained (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020) (offering financing for vehicles without long-term commitment or paperwork); Car
Sharing: An Alternative to Car Rental with ZipCar, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2020).
44. See About Us, RIDECELL, https://ridecell.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020); Shared
Mobility Services, LAUNCH MOBILITY, https://www.launchmobility.com/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2020).
45. See SAIF BENJAAFAR ET AL., DRIVERS, RIDERS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE IMPACT OF
THE SHARING ECONOMY ON MOBILITY (June 22, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3035478
(concluding that the sharing economy may lead to increased vehicle ownership and vehicle
operation costs); Cherry, supra note 40, at 179–80 (noting that Uber and Lyft have transformed
from a “green alternative” to “aggressively” for-profit businesses). But see First-ever Zipcar Impact
Report Shows Car Sharing’s Significant Social and Environmental Benefits, and Its Essential Role
in Creating Better Cities, ZIPCAR (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.zipcar.com/press/releases/impact
report2018 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
46. Early reports suggest that auto dealers are adapting to the COVID-19 economy by offering
customers greater ability to buy online and a more “flexible” purchase process. See Todd C. Frankel,
No Handshakes. A Bad Economy. These Car Salesmen Shifted Tactics — and Succeeded, WASH.
POST (Aug. 12, 2020 6:00AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/road-to-recovery/2020/08/12/nohandshakes-bad-economy-these-car-salesmen-shifted-tactics-succeeded/; Michael Wayland, The
Coronavirus Pandemic Has Upended Auto Sales and Buying a Car Will Never Be the Same, CNBC
(May 21, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/the-coronavirus-pandemic-hasupended-auto-sales-and-buying-a-car-will-never-be-the-same.html.
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Part III then considers people’s current leading method to deal with
burdensome auto loans—filing bankruptcy. It argues that although consumer
bankruptcy’s ability to help people keep their cars indicates that filing is
useful for some people, it is a sub-par solution.47 This Part also predicts how
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton will make
filing bankruptcy even less useful for people, further enhancing auto dealers’
and lenders’ market power.48
Overall, Parts I through III argue that power imbalances between auto
lenders and consumers have widened and likely will continue to widen, to
the detriment of Americans for whom cars are necessities. Drawing on
regulations and reforms suggested with regard to other consumer credit
products, Part IV outlines and evaluates a series of ideas to facilitate needed
“car security” for Americans. These ideas range from tailored disclosures to
forgiving auto loans to subsidizing car ownership. As Part V concludes, this
Article’s discussion underscores that the progression of transportation in
America is such that cars have become necessities. Their necessity, coupled
with the continued evolution of the auto finance market, may render many of
these reform ideas ineffective. Ultimately, what is required at this crossroads
is a more encompassing and nuanced consideration of how to facilitate
transportation in America.
I

T E OOMIN

AUTO LOAN MARKETPLACE

Auto loans are the fastest growing entry on American households’
financial ledgers. Over the past decade, the total balance of auto loans
outstanding increased 75%.49 As of the end of 2019, Americans owe $1.33
trillion in auto loan debt.50 Subprime borrowers account for about one-quarter
of that outstanding debt.51 Loan terms are also increasing. The seven-year
auto loan has featured prominently in the news recently. In the first half of
2019, one-third of auto loans financing the purchase of new vehicles came
with terms longer than six years, as compared to 10% in 2009.52

47. This Part relies heavily on insights from Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, in which my
co-authors and I provide evidence of consumer bankruptcy filings motivated by keeping cars.
48. 592 U.S. ___ (2021), No. 19−357 (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions
/20pdf/19-357_6k47.pdf; see also SCOTUSblog Outline of City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton Case,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/city-of-chicago-illinois-v-fulton/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2020) [hereinafter SCOTUSblog Chicago v. Fulton docket].
49. See Cross et al., supra note 3, at 4; Levitin, supra note 6, at 1261, fig.1 (detailing outstanding
auto loan balances from 2003 to 2019).
50. See Buchwald, supra note 31.
51. See id.; Cross et al., supra note 3, at 7.
52. See Ben Eisen & Adrienne Roberts, The Seven-Year Auto Loan: America’s Middle Class
Can’t Afford Its Cars, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2019, 10:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theseven-year-auto-loan-americas-middle-class-cant-afford-their-cars-11569941215; Phil LeBeau,
Subprime Loans for Autos Show A Big Decline As Term Length Hits A Record High, CNBC (Dec.
7, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/07/subprime-auto-loans-show-big-decline-as-
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This Part begins with an overview of the mechanics of “traditional” auto
sales and loans to detail the baseline power dynamics of the marketplace. It
then sets forth a typology of innovations in the purchase, lease, and delivery
of cars. This typology shows that the innovations in the auto marketplace
likely will reinforce and enhance dealers’ and lenders’ ability to control the
terms of car leasing, sales, and financing to consumers’ detriment.
A POWER DYNAMICS IN TRADITIONAL AUTO LOAN DEALS
The structure of “traditional” auto loans inherently gives the upper hand
to lenders, creating an environment in which lenders may take advantage of
consumers. That Americans often need cars to survive day-to-day life only
exacerbates the power disparity between lenders and consumers. 53 Car
purchases, new or used, are predominately tied up with the loan: after
negotiating an already relatively complicated and atypical purchase,
involving the car, upgrades, trade-ins, warranties, and service contracts, the
consumer must then negotiate financing through the dealer unless she has
somehow managed to line up third party financing in advance.54 At present,
almost nine out of ten buyers finance their cars through the dealership. 55
Making the transaction “bundle” even more confusing for buyers, the auto
loan pricing may be linked with other purchase terms, such as warranties,
insurance, and trade-in of old vehicles.56
Buyers also generally have little knowledge of the behind-the-scenes
aspect of auto lending, which involves immediate loan assignment and
indirect lending. In brief, the dealer agrees to make a loan only after it has
already lined up the customer’s actual lender, “a financial institution such as
a bank, credit union, or captive finance company,” to which the loan is
assigned. 57 For example, though some subprime auto dealers provide
financing directly to consumers, the majority of people who purchase
vehicles at “Buy Here Pay Here” lots or similar outfits enter into indirect
lending deals.58 As Levitin discusses, the business relationship in the indirect
term-length-hits-record-high.html (noting that in 2017, “Experian says the average term for a new
vehicle auto loan hit an all-time high of 69 months”).
53. See generally Levitin, supra note 6 (detailing how the auto loan market is set up to
disadvantage consumers).
54. See id. at 1261–64.
55. See id. at 1262. Levitin also details “yo-yo” scams in which customers drive off with a
vehicle only to be told a couple days later that they were not approved for the financing and must
agree to a higher interest rate if they want to keep the vehicle. See id. at 1304–06.
56. See id. at 1261–62.
57. See id. at 1262–63.
58. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, EXAMINATION PROCEDURES: AUTO FINANCE 2–3
(2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb_automobile-finance-examinationprocedures.pdf (overviewing indirect and direct lending); James A. Wilson Jr. & Sandra L.
DiChiara, The Changing Landscape in Indirect Automobile Lending, 2 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 29,
34 (2005) (noting indirect lending deals with subprime borrowers); STACY-ANN ELVY, THE
INTERNET OF THINGS: THE FUTURE OF COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRIVACY chapter 4 (Cambridge
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auto lending market is between the lender and dealer, not the lender and the
actual borrower, which exacerbates a market structure that already
disadvantages consumers. 59 This dynamic remains key when considering
new innovations in lending, detailed in the next subpart.
What people pay for their vehicles shows the disadvantageous market
structure. Per the Outside Financial Auto Loan Markup Index, a typical car
buyer in 2018 paid an extra $1,791 in “marked up financing,” which includes
loan markup and related fees.60 That amount increased to $1,850 in 2019,
greater than an inflation-adjusted predicted increase. 61 As calculated by
Levitin based on a prior study of auto loan overcharges, this markup
amounted to over $54 billion in extra financing charges in 2018.62
The disadvantageous market structure also means that auto sales and
lending is ready-made for discriminatory behavior. Studies have found
discrimination in auto sales on the basis of gender and race.63 There likewise
exists robust evidence of historical discrimination in auto insurance based on
ZIP code, resulting in communities of color paying more for auto insurance
absent legitimate reason for the price difference, such as driving history.64
Recent studies focused on discrimination in auto lending similarly found
evidence of discrimination on the basis of gender and race. For instance,
Alexander Butler, Erik Mayer, and James Weston utilized credit bureau
University Press, forthcoming 2021) (draft manuscript on file with author) (discussing “Buy Here
Pay Here” dealers).
59. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1263–65, 1276–79.
60. Id. at 1292–93 n.141 (citing Outside Financial Auto Loan Markup Index, OUTSIDE
FINANCIAL, https://www.outsidefinancial.com/auto-loan-markup-index (last visited Mar. 12,
2020)). A loan markup is an additional 1-2% that a dealer adds to the financial institution’s interest
rate as commission for arranging the auto financing with no obligation to disclose this to the
consumer. Outside Financial Auto Loan Markup Index, OUTSIDE FIN., https://www.outsidefinancial
.com/auto-loan-markup-index (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
61. Outside Financial Auto Loan Markup Index, supra note 60. The all items Consumer Price
Index rose 2.5% between 2018 and 2019, equaling a predicted $1,836 in marked up financing in
2019 if all else remained constant. Consumer Price Index – February 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATS., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf (Mar. 11, 2020) (reporting data on a 12month rolling basis). Marked up financing seems to be increasing at a greater rate than the average
consumer purchases. Id.
62. Levitin, supra note 6, at 1292.
63. See, e.g., Fiona Scott Morton et al., Consumer Information and Price Discrimination: Does
the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?, 1 QUANTITATIVE
MARKETING & ECON. 65, 65–69 (2003) (finding that “offline” in-person Black and Latinx car
buyers paid 2% more than other buyers, but no statistical evidence of race discrimination); Ian Ayres
& Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 304 (1995) (finding discrimination on the basis of gender or race); Pinelopi Koujianoi
Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622 (1996) (finding no evidence of discrimination on the
basis of gender and race); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations
and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 109–110 (1995) (finding discrimination on the
basis of gender and race); Levitin, supra note 6, at 1297–98.
64. See DEVIN FERGUS, LAND OF THE FEE: HIDDEN COSTS AND THE DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 97–122 (2018) (recounting the “insurance wars” of the 1980s and
1990s).
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records from 2005 to 2017 to find that Black and Latinx individuals’ auto
loan approval rate was 1.5% lower than other borrowers after controlling for
creditworthiness. 65 Another study noted that “the top 5% of customers
account for over 40% of dealer markup from auto lending” and that the Black
and Latinx customers systematically have been charged higher markups.66
Consumer protection organizations have raised concerns about
discrimination in auto buying, including an inability of minorities to
negotiate the terms of auto financing to the same degree or effectiveness as
other borrowers.67 Their worries are warranted. Recently, in May 2020, one
of the largest subprime auto lenders, Santander, agreed to a $550 million
settlement after being accused by thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia of targeting low-income communities for loans too large for their
incomes to service and for charging excessive fees, among other predatory
practices.68
Overall, Americans face significant barriers to negotiating their
“traditional” auto loans productively. That people are so car-dependent likely
only exacerbates their inability and disincentive to negotiate, particularly if
they are cash-strapped.69 In important ways, these consumers are akin to low65. Alexander W. Butler et al., Discrimination in the Auto Loan Market (June 25, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301009 (finding other evidence consistent with racial discrimination).
66. Mark A. Cohen, Imperfect Competition in Auto Lending: Subjective Markup, Racial
Disparity, and Class Action Litigation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 21 (2012); see also Kerwin Kofi Charles
et al., Rates for Vehicle Loans: Race and Loan Source, 98 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS
315 (2008) (finding racial discrimination in auto financing in interest rates from finance companies);
Creola Johnson, The Magic of Groups Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 182-84 (2010) (discussing how interest
rate markups disproportionately affect Black and Latinx borrowers). Native Americans also are
more likely to be sold subprime auto loans. See Megan Horning, Border Town Bullies: The Bad
Auto Deal and Subprime Lending Problem Among Navajo Nation Car Buyers, 73 NAT. LAWS.
GUILD J. 193 (Winter 2016), https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/article/border-town-bullies-the-badauto-deal-and-subprime-lending-problem-among-navajo-nation-car-buyers/.
67. See Delvin Davis, Non-Negotiable: Negotiation Doesn’t Help African Americans and
Latinos on Dealer-Financed Car Loans, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 2–3 (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2386005; LISA RICE & ERICH SCHWARTZ JR.,
NAT. FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYING A CAR: HOW THE COLOR OF
YOUR SKIN CAN AFFECT YOUR CAR-SHOPPING EXPERIENCE (Jan. 2018), https://
nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Discrimination-When-Buying-a-Car-FINAL1-11-2018.pdf.; NAT. CONS. L. CTR., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN AUTO LOAN MARKUPS: STATE-BYSTATE DATA (June 2015), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/ib-auto-dealers-racial_
disparites.pdf. Class action suits alleging discriminatory markups have resulted in substantial
settlements; the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Department of Justice also have
brought enforcement actions for discriminatory markups. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1297–98.
68. See David Tracy, Subprime Auto Loan Giant Pays $550 Million After Charges of Predatory
Practices, JALPONIK (May 20, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://jalopnik.com/subprime-auto-loan-giantpays-550-million-after-charge-1843561031; David Shepardson, Santander Agrees to $550 Million
U.S. Settlement Over Subprime Auto Loans, REUTERS (May 19, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-autos-lending/santander-agrees-to-550-million-settlement-over-subprime-autoloans-idUSKBN22V2GS.
69. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1285–89 (highlighting that, especially given the auto sale and
loan market structures, negotiating auto loans is uniquely stressful for consumers).
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income and cash-strapped Americans who turn to payday lenders and other
alternative finance outlets in time of need and who often will accept almost
any loan terms.70 Typical solutions to reducing the power disparity between
providers and consumers, such as disclosures and determining ability-to-pay,
may not adequately address the potential for abuse and discrimination
inherent in the market structure. 71 Indeed, as detailed in the following
subpart, although new innovations in the auto leasing and lending are
marketed as benefitting consumers and gig economy entrepreneurs, they
come with the potential to widen the power gap between lenders and
consumers.
POWER DYNAMICS IN CUTTIN ED E AUTO LOAN DEALS
Fintech innovations in auto buying and lending are chipping away at the
“traditional” auto buying and lending arrangement in which people travel to
new and used auto dealers to look at cars in person and apply for a loan at the
dealership. This subpart details three categories of innovations: websites and
smartphone applications that market cars and auto loans to consumers, often
aggregating available options; platforms, usually delivered via smartphone,
that provide subscription programs to facilitate shorter-term leases of
vehicles; and lending programs marketed specifically to ride-sharing
entrepreneurs. The discussion of each type of innovation evaluates whether
these products will enhance consumers’ well-being, as providers often
contend, or whether these products will maintain lenders’ advantages in the
negotiation and provision of auto loans.
A

L

W

P

America, as a country, is increasingly moving online and onto
smartphones. Many lower-income Americans, in particular, use their phones
to access the Internet and banking and lending products.72 This has not gone
70. See Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at 24–30 (overviewing payday loans and other
alternative financing); Ernesto A. Longa & Nathalie Martin, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do
Payday and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY CONS. L. REV. 524, 560–61 (2012)
(overviewing findings about the demographics of people who use high-cost loan); Payday Lending
in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 18,
2012),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2012/paydaylending-in-america (finding that 69% of payday loan customers use the loan to cover recurring
expenses).
71. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1306–18 (explaining why typical policy recommendations are
incomplete in the context of auto lending); Cross et al., supra note 3, at 7 (listing ideas for
protections for consumers in auto sale and lending deals).
72. See Kurt Bauman, New Survey Questions Do a Better Job Capturing Mobile Use, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/internetaccess.html (detailing how Americans report accessing the Internet); Ellen A. Merry, Mobile
Banking: A Closer Look at Survey Measures, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS. (Mar. 27,
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/mobile-banking-a-closer-look-atsurvey-measures-20180327.htm (noting an upward trend in mobile banking and that “[i]n 2017,
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unnoticed by banking and consumer credit providers and the range of auto
loan providers now offer online options.
Traditional banks and credit unions allow customers to apply for a car
loan via their websites.73 Some of these providers promise same-day decision
and funding of auto purchases.74 These websites open up opportunities for
people to pre-shop for an auto loan, which could disrupt the typical auto
purchase and lending bundle that puts consumers at a disadvantage—
provided they have knowledge and incentive to shop for a loan before looking
for a new or used vehicle.75 At the same time, auto dealers also have moved
their loans online, which perpetuates the current purchase and financing
power dynamic while possibly further cementing the coupling of purchase
and financing.76
In addition to traditional lenders and auto dealers moving online, new
websites and platforms aggregating vehicles for sale and potential financing
for those vehicles have rolled out over the past several years. Cars.com,
CarMax, and TrueCar are some of the initial and better-known entrants in the
online vehicle sales marketplace. 77 CarMax, which started as a brick-andmortar, in-person used-car retailer, has added a financing pre-approval option
on its website, through which customers are linked with traditional banks and
credit unions for a loan for the particular vehicle the customer has selected.78

about half of U.S. adults with bank accounts had used a mobile phone to access a bank account in
the past year”).
73. See, e.g., Auto Loans & Car Financing, BANK OF AMERICA, https://www.bankofamerica.
com/auto-loans/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Auto Loan Calculator, CHASE AUTO,
https://autofinance.chase.com/auto-finance/home (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Auto Loan Rates for
New & Used Cars, NAVY FED. CREDIT UNION, https://www.navyfederal.org/loans-cards/autoloans/auto-rates.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Auto Loans, PEN FED CREDIT UNION,
https://www.penfed.org/auto (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Jennifer Brozic, 4 Reasons To Consider
A Car Loan From A Credit Union, CREDIT KARMA (July 16, 2019), https://www.creditkarma.com/
auto/i/credit-union-car-loan/ (claiming that “[c]redit unions often have lower interest rates and
fewer minimum loan requirements than banks”).
74. See Auto Loans, LIGHTSTEAM, https://www.lightstream.com/auto-loans (last visited Mar.
13, 2020) (noting that it is a division of SunTrust Bank); Anna Baluch, How to Get an Instant Auto
Loan, LENDINGTREE (June 17, 2019), https://www.lendingtree.com/auto/how-to-get-an-instantauto-loan/ (noting that traditional banks and credit unions often offer instant loans).
75. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1323 (proposing a mandatory vehicle delivery waiting period
unless the purchaser obtains independent third-party financing and noting that “automated
underwriting [] allows for near real time decision-making” on consumer loans).
76. See, e.g., Apply for Credit and Auto Financing, GM FIN., https://www.gmfinancial.com/enus/apply.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Honda New and Honda Certified Pre-Owned Vehicles
Financing, HONDA FIN. SERVS., https://www.hondafinancialservices.com/finance (last visited Mar.
13, 2020); Toyota Financial, TOYOTA FIN. SERVS., https://www.toyotafinancial.com/us/en.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
77. New Cars, Used Cars, Car Dealers, Prices & Reviews, CARS.COM, https://www.cars.com/
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020); CarMax – Browse Used Cars and New Cars Online, CARMAX,
https://www.carmax.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Car Prices, Owner Reviews & Inventory,
TRUECAR, https://www.truecar.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
78. Financing at CarMax, CARMAX, https://www.carmax.com/car-financing (last visited Mar.
13, 2020).
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Newer entrants in the auto retailer and lending marketplace have taken
cues from other business inspired by technological innovations, including
fintech financers.79 Carvana, for instance, is best known for its multi-story
car vending machines. 80 It also allows customers to finance their auto
purchases with cash or money they find from their own financial institution
(that is, the traditional banks and credit union already discussed), or to get
financing directly from Carvana.81 On its frequently asked questions page,
Carvana explains that as long as a customer is eighteen years or older, makes
at least $4,000 per year, and has no “active bankruptcies,” they will be able
to obtain financing, which may only be used to purchase vehicles from
Carvana.82
Carvana’s promise to provide financing for those customers with bad
credit follows in the footsteps of other online options that people with
tarnished credit can turn to for auto loans. Car.Loan.com, an early entrant,
specializes in loans for people in bankruptcy and otherwise in need of
subprime financing. 83 Similarly, myAutoloan.com sources a national
network of lenders to offer customers an auto loan within minutes.84 Auto
Credit Expense, self-billed as “helping people with any-credit auto financing
since 1999!,” likewise offers fast pre-qualification 85 and discloses that it
partners with lenders and dealers in customers’ areas to provide financing
options.86
Understanding that partner networks underlie the operations of the
finance divisions of Auto Credit Expense and other online networks is crucial
to assessing how these online and other financing options may affect power
dynamics between consumers and lenders. The business connection between
these aggregation sites and lenders bring concerns that these platforms are
working for the lenders, not their customers. The consumer’s overall welfare
could be diminished in a marketplace where most people do not know about,
and perhaps do not have a reason to question, the underlying business

79. See Odinet, supra note 4, at 793 (discussing a range of fintech lenders).
80. CARVANA, https://www.carvana.com/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); see also
Sven Gustafson, Carvana Opens 2 More Used-Car Vending Machines in U.S., AUTOBLOG (June 8,
2019), https://www.autoblog.com/2018/06/08/carvana-used-car-vending-machines/.
81. CARVANA, supra note 80.
82. Frequently Asked Financing Questions, CARVANA, https://www.carvana.com/learnfinancing (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
83. Quick and Simple Auto Credit, CAR.LOAN.COM, https://car.loan.com/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2020).
84. New or Used Auto Loan & Refinancing, MYAUTOLOAN.COM, https://www.myautoloan.com
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
85. About Auto Credit Express, AUTO CREDIT EXPRESS, https://www.autocreditexpress.
com/about/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
86. Id.; see also Brittney Mayer, 8 Providers of Bad-Credit Auto Financing in 2020,
BADCREDIT.ORG (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.badcredit.org/how-to/bad-credit-auto-financing/
(describing Auto Credit Express as “network of dealer partners has closed $1 billion in bad credit
auto loans”).
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relationships that facilitate it. This concern about consumer welfare seems to
intensify with even newer companies.
The most recent entrants in the auto lending marketplace—those that
have come onto the scene within the last two years—fall directly within the
fintech lending umbrella. These companies seek to leverage people’s use of
mobile devices and also rely heavily on similar partner networks. For
example, AutoGravity initially was a finance platform designed to be used
on a smartphone or tablet. 87 It included a “credit apps” screen, which
promised customers that they would be connected with no less than four
lenders. These lenders were the traditional banks, credit unions, and dealers’
finance arms detailed above, including Santander, the subprime lender that
agreed to a $550 million settlement over their predatory practices.88 When it
launched, AutoGravity’s two lead investors were Daimler and Volkswagon
Credit.89 AutoGravity also provided its technology to Volkswagon, Kia, and
Audi for their own financing apps. 90 As of summer 2020, AutoGravity
transitioned its business model to “Car Subscriptions – the new wave of car
ownership.” The next subpart details auto subscriptions programs.91
AutoFi is perhaps the freshest entrant into the market as its rollout is
ongoing.92 It similarly describes itself as an “e-commerce software platform
that allows car buyers, for the first time, to purchase and finance a car entirely
online. AutoFi’s platform connects an auto dealer’s customers to a network
of lenders, providing a fast, mobile-first checkout experience.”93 Its network
includes the same banks, credit unions, and, most importantly, dealer
financing as AutoGravity did when it was launched. For instance, Ford Motor
Credit Company was among its initial investors.94 Chase Auto Finance joined
the platform about a year later.95 Unlike AutoGravity, AutoFi is upfront that

87. AUTOGRAVITY, https://www.autogravity.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2020); Brian Pascus,
Mercedes’ Parent Company is Betting on a Startup That’s Trying to Fix One of the Most Annoying
Things About Buying A Car, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.
businessinsider.com/daimler-autogravity-startup-aims-to-change-car-buying-2018-9 (discussing
AutoGravity).
88. See Pascus, supra note 87 (noting that AutoGravity has “lending partnerships with banks
including U.S. Bank, TD Bank, and Santander”); supra note 68.
89. See Pascus, supra note 87.
90. See id.
91. See AUTOGRAVITY, https://www.autogravity.com/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
92. See AutoAlert and AutoFi Collaborate to Boost and Simplify Customer Vehicle Purchases
Online, AUTOALERT (May 14, 2020), https://www.autoalert.com/autoalert-autofi-collaborateboost-simplify-customer-vehicle-purchases-online/ (referring to new AutoFi collaboration); Online
Auto Financing, AUTOFI, https://www.autofi.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
93. About Us, AUTOFI, https://www.autofi.com/about-us (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
94. See Lauren Debter, AutoFi Raises $10 Million Series A To Make It Easier To Get A Car
Loan, FORBES (Aug. 24, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/
2017/08/24/autofi-series-a-ford-motor-credit/#6f246f626fd8.
95. See William Hoffman, AutoFi Adds Lenders to Network Amid Expansion to Used Dealers,
AUTO FIN. NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.autofinancenews.net/allposts/operations/riskmanagement/autofi-adds-lenders-to-network-amid-expansion-to-used-dealers/.
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one of its main goals is to assist auto dealers by providing financing solutions
to help them win back customers who have gone to banks and credit unions
for auto loans.96
Both AutoGravity and AutoFi, as well as the older lending websites that
rely on aggregation, promise to reduce transaction fees, enable access to
credit for some people at more competitive terms, and provide credit for
others in the first instance. 97 For the newest entrants, a key part of this
promise stems from these lenders’ use of artificial intelligence and big data
to make lending decisions, which fintech lenders claim will allow them to
upend the consumer credit industry.98 Their use of big data and their ability
to make fast decisions, however, brings a couple core concerns.
The first concern is that the rapidity with which customers receive a
decision will impact customers’ decision making. These platforms quickly
display an offer or a handful of offers. In turn, customers may make an even
quicker, less scrutinized decision about accepting a loan than they would if
offered the loan in person at an auto dealership.99 In addition, these platforms
may exacerbate people’s disincentive to shop around because they may think
that the fintech platforms are not affiliated with the auto lender they are
purchasing from and assume the platform’s business depends on giving their
customers the best deal. In reality, initial research shows that online lenders
are considering dealers their true customers and are “offering the dealers a
96. See Jeff Gitlin, What is AutoFi? How it Works and Potential Benefits, LENDEDU (Sept. 9,
2017), https://lendedu.com/blog/what-is-autofi (discussing AutoFi). Note that lendedu is a website
that receives compensation from partners. See id.
97. See Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at 38 (detailing the marketing claims of these websites
and platforms); Lauren Sanders, Fintech and Consumer Protection: A Snapshot, NAT. CONSUMER
L. CTR. 13 (March 2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/cons-protection/rpt-fintech-andconsumer-protection-a-snapshot-march2019.pdf (listing fintech products).
98. See Fintech: Auto Loan Software’s Place in the Industry, DEFI SOLUTIONS, https://defi
solutions.com/answers/fintech-auto-loan-softwares-place-industry/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2020)
(discussing big data); Manisha Patel, Auto Finance May be the Next Sector to Watch in Fintech,
FINTECH TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://thefintechtimes.com/auto-finance-may-be-the-next-sectorto-watch-in-fintech/ (noting that auto finance “hasn’t seen much in the way of innovation over the
last 40 or so years”). Other fintech lenders are expanding their operations to include auto loans. See
Blend Expands From Mortgages and Consumer Loans Into Auto Financing, AUTO REMARKETING
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.autoremarketing.com/autofinjournal/blend-expands-mortgages-andconsumer-loans-auto-financing (discussing a fintech company, Blend, that processes $2 billion in
mortgage and consumer loans daily that recently decided to enter the auto loan market).
99. See Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 76–77
(2018) (discussing how speed may encourage bad decision making); MARCO DI MAGGIO &
VINCENT W. YAO, FINTECH BORROWERS: LAX-SCREENING OR CREAM-SKIMMING? 25–6 (May
30, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224957 (finding that fintech
lenders enable people with a desire for immediate credit to obtain loans allowing them to borrow
beyond their means); Elizabeth Harris, Warning: Your Smartphone Could Lead to Dumb Money
Mistakes, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2016), forbes.com/sites/elizabethharris/2016/09/28/warning-yoursmartphone-could-lead-to-dumb-money-mistakes/ (discussing a study finding that people are less
financially literate on smartphones and computers); Levitin, supra note 6, at 1284–87 (discussing
how “traditional” auto lending facilitates through the dealership in-person also encourages people
to make fast decisions).
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higher penetration of add-on products that pad and disguise the price of
financing.”100 Instead of enhancing competition, this model likely will retard
competition and enhance dealers’ and lenders’ power.
Additionally, the rapidity of receiving an auto loan and the delivery of
documents to consumers via computers and tablets may induce people to sign
agreements they have not seen or had a chance to understand. This
environment brings the potential to entice lenders to include fees and terms
in these agreements to which customers have not agreed.101 Although lenders
and sellers may do the same in other circumstances, the set-up of transactions
on computers, tablets, and smartphones has the potential to further impair
people’s recognition that they should scrutinize delivered agreements. 102
Studies show that people read text differently on paper than on a screen.
Screens, smartphones, and tablets inhibit people’s ability to navigate long
and complex text, which decreases reading comprehension.103
The second major concern relates to the reliance on big data, algorithms,
and machine learning to make lending decisions. This concern applies both
to aggregation websites and platforms and to banks and dealer-lenders who
use fintech software.104 Research about similar algorithms in the realms of
marketing, policing, and education have brought worries about privacy and
fairness. 105 Recent discussion about algorithmic fairness highlight that the

100. Sanders, supra note 97, at 13; see also Bradley, supra note 99, at 63-70 (detailing how
LendingTree similarly aggregates loans from providers, which brings worries that LendingTree is
working for providers and not its end customers and could have anticompetitive consequences).
101. See Sanders, supra note 97, at 13.
102. See Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms Of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, Research
Shows, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-you-readterms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows (discussing how people share information
and do not read agreements online). For example, in the past, rent-to-own transactions raised these
concerns. See generally Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. The
Rent-to-Own Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 385, 387 (1996)
(overviewing concerns about customer-seller interactions with rent-to-own transactions); see also
James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 751 (1991).
103. See Ferris Jabr, The Reading Brain in the Digital Age: The Science of Paper versus Screens,
Scientific American (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/reading-paperscreens/ (discussing studies).
104. See Niccolo Mejia, AI Startups in Auto Lending – 2 Well-Funded Examples, EMERJ (Dec.
30, 2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-startups-auto-lending/ (discussing Zest AI,
whose product “could allow auto lenders to approve more car loan applicants without added risk”).
105. See generally Johnson et al., supra note 38, at 504 (discussing fintech finance’s use of
artificial intelligence and machine learning); MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL
ALGORITHM: THE SCIENCE OF SOCIALLY AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN 1–14 (2020) (introducing
concerns about big data and algorithms); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION:
HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2017) (detailing data discrimination by search
engines); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (overviewing instances of algorithmic
discrimination); Nicol Turner Lee, Algorithmic Bias Detection And Mitigation: Best Practices And
Policies To Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduceconsumer-harms/ (“Algorithms are harnessing volumes of macro- and micro-data to influence
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primary problem stems from the difficulty, near impossibility of determining
how algorithms make decisions once they have been active and learning.106
That the programs are privately owned and heavily guarded as trade secrets
only add questions about how lending algorithms are designed, at the outset,
to leverage underwriting data.107
Applied to auto loans, overly automated underwriting processes could
result in discrimination in the provision of credit based on gender, race, and
ethnicity, replicating or exacerbating the discrimination already found in the
auto sale and loan markets.108 This fear, again, is not ungrounded based on
initial research. The issue was taken up by the most recent study of fintech
lending, which focused on interest-rate decisions in the mortgage market. Its
authors found that fintech platforms decreased discrimination against Black
and Latinx borrowers by 40%. 109 Note that fintech platforms still
discriminated against borrowers on the basis of race, just less than what
occurs as a result of face-to-face lending decisions.110 Applied to auto loans,
given their unique and evolving market dynamics, combined with the
relationship between platforms and lenders, the potential for heightened
discrimination relative to traditional auto loans should remain worrisome.111
A

S

P

Taking Americans’ need to access automobiles a step further, a handful
of other new fintech companies have created platforms to facilitate short- and
long-term leases of vehicles. These platforms provide alternatives to services

decisions affecting people in a range of tasks, from making movie recommendations to helping
banks determine the creditworthiness of individuals.”).
106. See Alexandra Chouldechova & Aaron Roth, The Frontiers of Fairness in Machine
Learning, working paper (2019), https://www.arxiv-vanity.com/papers/1810.08810/ (detailing
causes of unfairness, including “bias encoded in data”); Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and
Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 25–29 (2018) (discussing
concerns about fintech innovations in lending).
107. See Odinet, supra note 4, at 809 (noting that proprietary algorithms limit a purchasing
financial institution’s ability to review underwriting quality, credit quality, and adequacy of loan
pricing); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 101–39 (2015) (detailing data’s role in finance).
108. See Odinet, supra note 4, at 808–812 (discussing federal agencies’ responses to concerns
about big data and discrimination in the provision of consumer credit); Talia B. Gillis, False Dreams
of Algorithmic Fairness: The Case of Credit Pricing (Feb. 18, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3571266 (discussing how lenders use big data to make credit decisions and how that could increase
prices for minorities and other protected groups); Andrew L. Sandler et al., Using Disparate Impact
Analysis to Establish Discrimination in Lending, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 417, 420 (2013).
109. Robert Bartless et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 5 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25943, 2019), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/
papers/discrim.pdf.
110. Id.
111. See Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459,
466–86 (2019) (creating a simulation experiment based on real-world mortgage data to demonstrate
that allocating mortgage decision making to algorithms and big data may exacerbate pricing gaps).
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such as ZipCar112 and add the option of keeping cars for a longer period. The
uniting feature of these platforms is that customers do not work toward
ownership of vehicles; payments are not credited toward the ultimate
purchase of a vehicle.
Fair and Flexdrive, for instance, are both primarily app-based and
provide access to cars without long-term commitment and without the need
to register vehicles, pay for insurance, and maintain the car.113 Media reports
described Fair as a “car subscription service.”114 It allows people to lease
vehicles for as long as they want: “no loan or long-term commitment. Just
pay as you go and turn your car in any time.”115 As it entered the market, Fair
specifically targeted ride-sharing drivers and had pre-purchased Uber’s car
leasing business, Xchange Leasing. Since growing rapidly post-launch, Fair
has experienced profit shortfalls and has cut back significantly on investment
and personnel to scale-down its operations.116
Flexdrive offers a similar service. Once people download the app, they
can choose a car and how long they want to keep the car. When the
subscription ends, the “leaser” can renew their subscription to the same
vehicle or pick a new one.117 Media reviews of the app calculate monthly
payments at between $400 and $1,000.118 Similar to Fair, Flexdrive partners
with Lyft to give “qualified” drivers “an easy way . . . to get a vehicle they
can use to give rides.”119 To qualify, customers must be at least twenty-five
112. See supra note 43.
113. What is Fair and How Does It Work, supra note 43; Home, FLEXDRIVE,
https://www.flexdrive.com/ (Mar. 16, 2020). There also are a few other apps that offer or offered
services for particular types of vehicles or in particular locations. See, e.g., Better Than A Short
Term Car Lease, CANVAS CAR SUBSCRIPTION, https://drivecanvas.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020)
(offering low mileage options in San Francisco); Emily Delbridge, Flexdrive Car Subscription
Service Review, THE BALANCE (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/flexdrive-carsubscription-service-review-4588165 (discussing Book by Cadillac, a subscription service that
allowed customers to rent a Cadillac for $1,500 per month and Canvas); Short Term Electric
Subscriptions Made Simple, BORROW, https://joinborrow.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (renting
electric vehicles for a term of 3, 6, or 9 months in Los Angeles).
114. Jack Nerad, 5 Things You Need to Know About the Fair Car Subscription Service,
AUTOBYTEL, https://www.autobytel.com/car-buying-guides/features/5-things-you-need-to-knowabout-the-fair-car-subscription-service-132817/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); see also Trent Gillies,
How Car Subscription App Fair Wants To Disrupt The Market For Car Loans Using Subscriptions,
CNBC (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/19/fair-app-uses-subscription-model-topromote-car-ownership.html.
115. What is Fair and How Does It Work, supra note 43.
116. See Lucinda Shen & Alyssa Newcomb, This SoftBank-Backed Startup Sought to Disrupt the
Car Market. Instead, It Became a Poster Child for Disruption Gone Awry, FORTUNE (Dec. 19,
2019), https://fortune.com/2019/12/19/softbank-fair-car-market-disruption/ (detailing Fair’s
investment strategy); Ingrid Lunden, Fair, the Softbank-Backed Car Subscription Startup Lays Off
40% of Staff, Sacks CEO, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/24/fairthe-softbank-backed-car-subscription-startup-lays-off-40-of-staff-sacks-cfo/.
117. See Home, supra note 113; Help, FLEXDRIVE, https://www.flexdrive.com/help/ (last visited
Sept. 17, 2020).
118. See Delbridge, supra note 113.
119. Dealers, FLEXDRIVE, https://www.flexdrive.com/dealers/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020).
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years old, meet Lyft driver requirements, and pay a refundable security
deposit.120
Flexdrive’s requirements may price out and otherwise prohibit those
most in need of cars from using the service. This outcome, however, may not
be undesirable. The primary concern with these subscription services is that
they replicate auto leasing and financing without allowing customers to work
toward owning the vehicles.121 Renting a vehicle month after month without
moving toward buying represents a dramatic shift in how Americans access
automobiles. As with the newer fintech platforms offering auto loan
aggregation services, the extent to which vehicle subscription services will
gain traction across America—and thereby alter the auto market structure—
is difficult to estimate. But all these new platforms offer services that, when
considered in detail, lead to worries that people will pay more for cars over
the long term.
A

F

R

S

E

Auto subscription platforms like Fair and Flexdrive are attempting to
capitalize on the now established ride-sharing industry and gig economy. The
growth of ride-sharing itself also created a need for vehicles, from which
Uber and Lyft have tried to profit. Ride-sharing entrepreneurs necessarily
need vehicles. Some of these entrepreneurs may not have access to a car or
may want to upgrade their vehicles to attract higher-paying clientele.122 For
example, Uber Select and Black drivers make more per trip, but must drive a
luxury vehicle. 123 Lyft Lux imposes similar vehicle make and model
requirements, and also requires more recent model years for the cars.124
In light of drivers’ apparent need for help paying for vehicles, in 2015,
Uber established a now-defunct program, which it named its Vehicle
Solutions Program. The program offered auto leasing as well as auto
financing.125 Fair purchased the auto leasing division of that program, called

120. See Lyft Express Drive FAQ, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/expressdrive (last visited Sept. 1,
2020).
121. See Sanders, supra note 97, at 13 (noting this dynamic).
122. See Ezra Wolfgang, Financing A Car For Uber, FINDER (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.finder.com/uber-car-finance (last visited Mar. 17, 2019) (providing options for people
thinking about driving for a ride-sharing service to lease or finance a car); Nicole Arata, 5 Ways to
Get a Car to Drive for Uber or Lyft, NERDWALLET (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.
nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/5-ways-car-uber-lyft/ (same).
123. See Don M., Uber Select: Your Complete Driver Guide, RIDE SHARE CENTRAL (Aug. 28,
2018), https://ridesharecentral.com/uber-select-driver.
124. Compare id. with Lyft Lux, Lux Black, and Lux Black XL Rides for Drivers, LYFT,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012923147-Lyft-Lux-Lux-Black-and-Lux-Black-XLrides-for-drivers (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
125. See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber is Phasing Out Its Subprime Car-Leasing Division After
Massive Losses, THE VERGE (Aug. 8, 2017 12:02 PM), https://www.theverge.com
/2017/8/8/16112498/uber-phase-out-xchange-car-leasing-losses (detailing the Vehicles Solutions
Program). Lyft has an auto-lending program, but it seems to be more of a short-term rental option.
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Uber Xchange Leasing, in early 2018. 126 At the time of the sale, Uber
reported losing $9,000 per car, which was eighteen times as much as it
projected it might lose via the leasing program. 127 When purchased, Fair
indicated that it would offer weekly leases of cars at a rate totaling $740 per
month.128
The Vehicle Solutions Program, as a whole, became the subject of
intense scrutiny and ended in a $20 million settlement with the FTC.129 The
program, in addition to offering drivers what later were described as
subprime leases, 130 linked drivers with auto dealers and lenders. Uber
automatically deducted loan payments from drivers’ income. If a driver’s
income was insufficient or if a driver stopped working for Uber, the driver
was required to pay the lender directly.131
Like other loan aggregation platforms, some of these loans came from
subprime lenders.132 The most notable story told in reports about the program
is that of Richard Brunelle, a fifty-eight year old man, who received credit to
purchase a Kia Optima through Uber. The loan had a 22.75% interest rate
and his monthly payments were about $1,000. 133 These terms, both the
interest rate and the connection of the loans to driving for Uber, led Brunelle
to comment: “I feel like Uber not only tossed us to these wolves, but they

See Lyft Express Drive, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/expressdrive (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
126. See William Hoffman, Fair Finalizes Deal to Buy Uber Xchange Leasing, AUTO FINANCE
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.autofinancenews.net/allposts/finance/loss-mitigation/exclusive
-fair-finalizes-deal-to-buy-uber-xchange-leasing/; Kirsten Korosec, Uber Closes Xchange Leasing
After Losing $9,000 Per Car, FORTUNE (Sept. 27, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/09/27/ubercloses-xchange-leasing-after-losing-9000-per-car/.
127. See Hoffman, supra note 126; Korosec, supra note 126.
128. See Julie Walmsley, Uber Drivers Without Credit Can Now Lease Used Cars For $0 Down
And $185 A Week, FORBES (May 29, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliewalmsley/2019/
05/29/uber-drivers-without-credit-can-now-lease-used-cars-for-0-down-and-185-aweek/#5c0adc131b40.
129. See Uber Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Settle FTC Charges That It Recruited Prospective
Drivers with Exaggerated Earnings Claims, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/uber-agrees-pay-20-million-settle-ftccharges-it-recruited (noting that part of the settlement related to Uber’s inflated claims about how
much drivers could make).
130. See Hawkins, supra note 125 (“Xchange offered subprime leases to people who have been
cleared to drive for Uber, but have poor or nonexistent credit scores . . . .”); Paris Marx, Uber’s
Auto-Loan Program Is Basically Indentured Servitude, BOLD ITALIC (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://thebolditalic.com/ubers-auto-loan-program-is-basically-indentured-servitude78011b8ea9b2 (noting that “[a]uto-finance experts who spoke to Bloomberg called Xchange’s
subprime loans predatory”).
131. See Molly Wood, Uber Drivers Struggle to Pay Subprime Auto Loans, MARKETPLACE (May
13, 2015), https://www.marketplace.org/2015/05/13/uber-drivers-struggle-pay-subprime-autoloans/ (discussing the auto loan part of Uber’s Vehicle Solutions Program).
132. See id.
133. See id.
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intentionally did it and they are making bank [on] it.”134 Drivers like Brunelle
felt stuck—either drive for Uber or have their vehicles repossessed.
Concerns about high interest rates played a key role in the FTC’s
complaint against Uber. The FTC complaint alleged that Uber connected its
drivers with lenders that charged drivers sometimes more than double the
industry average interest rate: “Uber’s marketing material to dealers has
acknowledged that the lease-to-own option was a ‘one size fits all’ product
with an ‘implied APR of 19.5%,’ significantly higher than even the industry
average interest rates for consumers with deep subprime credit scores.”135
Both the actual financial outcomes in the auto loan and auto lease programs
contradicted Ubers’ promise that the program would allow drivers to “own a
car for as little as $20/day.”136
Note that owning a vehicle for as little as $20 per day amounts to yearly
payments of over $7,000. Although the math may seem obvious, the monthly
and yearly totals likely were shocks to drivers. The CFPB’s complaint
database provides additional anecdotes from entrepreneurs to explore the
potential misperceptions and issues with Uber’s program.137 The database is
searchable by company name and product and sub-product type. 138 As of
September 2020, a search for Uber Technologies, Inc. returned 38 results
with complaint narratives.139 Of those results, 12 (32%) noted Uber’s vehicle
leasing program. The product and sub-product at issue in the complaints
about leases were credit reporting, consumer loan (vehicle lease), and vehicle
loan or lease (lease).
Five of the complainants discussed issues with credit reporting.140 One in
particular complained that Uber did not update the driver’s credit report with
information about timely payment. The complaint calculated that the driver
paid a total of about $13,000 under the lease via $150 weekly payments over
134. Id.
135. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 10, Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00261 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/cases/1523082ubercmplt.pdf.
136. Id. at 9, 10–11.
137. See Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020); Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help:
Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 181–86 (2017)
(overviewing the complaint database and the reasons why complaints may not be representative of
consumers’ issues with financial and credit products).
138. See Search the Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/?from=0&search
Field=all&searchText=&size=25&sort=created_date_desc (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
139. Author also searched all complaint data for “uber,” which returned an additional 30 results.
These additional results relate to consumers’ issues with Uber’s branded credit and debit cards and
with consumers claiming that they never had an Uber account. All complaint data on file with
author.
140. Four complained that Uber ran credit checks without the customers’ permission and even
after the customers were assured by Uber representatives that hard credit inquiries were not part of
the leasing process.
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one year and eight months: “It’s a huge money and I hope, that I deserved
fair report about this lease in my credit history/credit report.”141
The “huge money” detailed in that complaint was the subject of the
majority of the other complaints about Uber’s leasing program.142 One driver
wrote that the lease started at $160 per week for a period of 36 months and
then increased to $200 per week for a period of 36 months.143 At the same
time, the driver “had difficulty driving the Uber to have my earnings cover
the new price fluctuation of $ 800 monthly.”144 Ultimately the driver turned
the vehicle back to Uber, as discussed with Xchange Leasing, only to find
that “I will be responsible for the repossession charges.” 145 Somewhat
similarly, another driver complained that a $170 per week lease resulted in
an extra $150 of charges when Uber insisted that the leasing contract was for
more than $170 per week.146
Another complaint focuses on the weekly lease payments: “[T]he
monthly equivalent of {$610.00} to lease a Toyota Corolla (156 payments at
{$140.00} per week)? Seriously? This is absolutely predatory!” 147 This
complaint sums up a key part of the action against Uber. Weekly lease
payments did not calculate out to $20 per day.148 Ultimately, Uber induced
people to lease cars through their program that the drivers could have leased
even with subprime credit for significantly less per month.149
By the time that Uber shuttered its program, commentators called the
program a “financial and ethical disaster.”150 The financial disaster ran both
ways—to Uber and to drivers. The ethical part of the disaster references two
perceived problems. The first is unique to this program because it tied car
loan payments to driving for Uber. This led drivers to feel trapped in an
uneven relationship with Uber. Indeed, the relationship seemed so uneven
that some have likened the auto finance program to indentured servitude.151
The second problem connects with concerns about fintech auto lending
platforms, especially those that aggregate loans.152 Uber was not in business
for drivers, but for the auto dealerships and loan providers with which it
141. Complaint ID 2592467, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug 2, 2017), https://www
.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/search/detail/2592467.
142. Three complaints were about allegedly wrongful repossession of leased vehicles.
143. Complaint ID 2200059 (Nov. 9, 2016).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Complaint ID 2542505 (June 25, 2017).
147. Complaint ID 2095206 (Sept. 5, 2016).
148. See supra note 136.
149. See generally Foohey, supra note 137.
150. Ryan Felton, Uber Plans to Significantly Alters Its Reportedly Disastrous Subprime Lending
Program, JALOPNIK (Aug. 8, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://jalopnik.com/uber-plans-to-significantlyalter-its-reportedly-disast-1797636285.
151. In thinking about relative lease price and terms, consider that the cars that drivers leased
through Uber’s Xchange program were less expensive four-door sedans, not necessarily luxury
sedans and SUVs. See supra text accompanying note 146.
152. See supra Part II.B.i.
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partnered. Its marketing materials read to present a different story about
Xchange to dealers and lenders as compared to the story told to drivers. And
its lending practices and loan agreements seemed to result in drivers being
saddled with unexpected terms and fees, as shown in complaints to the CFPB.
Although this concern cuts across all auto loan deals, 153 the rapidity with
which Uber’s program and other newer programs deliver loan quotes and
final documents to borrowers heightens the worry that people will not
consider the benefits and costs to them of taking out the auto loan.154
Overall, at present, the auto loan origination market prioritizes the
interests of loan providers and auto companies over the interests of
consumers. The prioritization has the strong potential to lead people to take
out auto loans with disadvantageous interest rates, fees, and terms. Recent
fintech innovations in the auto lending market seem to exacerbate and
reinforce the disparities, further shifting market power to auto suppliers and
lenders. The next Part details how this power differential continues during
the life of auto loans, particularly when consumers default or fear they might
default on their loans.
II T E OOMIN

AUTO REPOSSESSION INDUSTRY

Although research shows that Americans generally continue paying their
auto loans as long as possible when faced with financial issues, 155 highpriced, marked-up loans necessarily will lead to delinquencies and defaults.
As auto loan originations have increased and auto loan terms have
lengthened,156 so too have delinquencies. Auto loan deficiencies hit an alltime high in 2018, with seven million Americans ninety or more days behind
on their auto loan payments.157 The subprime auto loan delinquency rate now
is higher than it was before the Great Recession.158 Among subprime loans,
nationwide, the delinquency rate is three times higher than among borrowers
with “prime” credit scores. 159 Similarly, a 2018 study found that after

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra Part II.A (discussing the complex and atypical nature of auto sale and loan deals).
See supra text accompanying notes 99–103.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
See Natasha Bach, A Record 7 Million Americans Are 90 Days Behind on Their Auto Loan
Payments, FORTUNE (Feb. 12, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/02/12/americans-late-on-carpayments/ (reporting on a study from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
158. See Wolf Richter, Auto Loan Delinquency Rates are Worse Now Than During the Financial
Crisis, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2018, 5:16 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/auto-loandelinquency-rates-worse-now-than-during-the-financial-crisis-2018-4; Repos Remain Stable While
Subprime Delinquencies Hit 10-Year High, COX AUTO. (May 16, 2019), https://www.
coxautoinc.com/market-insights/repos-remain-stable-while-subprime-delinquencies-hit-10-yearhigh/ (“At the end of 2018, the severe delinquency unit rate on subprime auto loans was at the
highest level in a decade.”).
159. See Signe-Mary McKernan et al., What Regions Have More Delinquent Auto Loan Debt?,
URBAN WIRE (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/what-regions-have-moredelinquent-auto-loan-debt.
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controlling for risk factors, auto loans with maturity lengths longer than five
years have higher delinquency rates.160
Delinquencies and defaults lead to repossessions. In 2017, a total of 1.7
million motor vehicles were projected to be repossessed, rivaling vehicle
repossession figures during the Great Recession.161 Even before the COVID19 crisis, the auto industry projected that repossessions would rise in coming
years, particularly for vehicles financed with subprime loans.162 As detailed
in the Introduction, the market structure of auto sales and lending incentivizes
the repeated repossession and sale of used vehicles, seemingly to the
detriment of consumers as they pay more for less valuable vehicles.163 And
as with car sales and auto loans, communities of color experience higher auto
repossession rates, adding to their automobile ownership costs.164
Technological innovations that allow cars to connect to the Internet
increasingly have aided auto lenders’ repossession efforts, fueling the
repeated repossessions and sales of used vehicles. The most noteworthy tool
is a starter interruption device (SID), also termed a remote vehicle disabler.165
SIDs entered the passenger vehicle repossession scene in the late 1990s.166
They allow the lender or dealer that controls the device to disable the ignition
switch of a vehicle, preventing it from starting.167 To turn the switch off, the
vehicle also must be off. This prevents vehicles from becoming stranded
while driving down the road. But it has not stopped people’s cars from being
160. See Zhengfeng Guo et al., Risks of Long-Term Auto Loans (June 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3290841. Subprime auto loan bonds likewise have experienced increased delinquencies.
See Matt Scully, Subprime Auto Bond Delinquencies Highest in 20 Years, Says Fitch, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-14/subprime-auto-bonddelinquencies-highest-in-20-years-says-fitch.
161. See Nick Zulovich, Forecast Has 2017 Repo Total Approaching 1.8M, AUTO
REMARKETING (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.autoremarketing.com/financial-services/forecast-has2017-repo-total-approaching-1-point-8-million; David LaGesse, Secrets of the Modern Repo Man,
U.S. NEWS (Apr. 28, 2009), https://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/technology
/articles/2009/04/28/secrets-of-the-modern-repo-man (noting that in 2008, “lenders took back more
than 1.6 million autos, a jump of 12 percent over 2007”).
162. See Muller, supra note 20.
163. See text accompanying supra notes 29–30.
164. See The Color of Debt: Credit Card Debt by Race and Ethnicity, DEMOS, https://www.
demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET_TheColorofDebt_Demos.pdf (reporting
based on 2008 data that Black and Latinx individuals are more likely to have their car repossessed).
165. See ELVY, supra note 58, at chapter 4 (discussing “asset collection systems and
technology”); Jim Henry, Words Matter: Starter Interrupt Or Kill Switch, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimhenry/2017/02/28/words-matter-starter-interrupt-or-kill-switch/
#1aa1495e76a2 (discussing SIDs).
166. See LaGesse, supra note 160, at 1–2 (detailing four vehicle tracking innovations); Thomas
B. Hudson & Daniel J. Laudicina, The Emerging Law of Starter Interrupt Devices, 61 BUS. LAW.
843 (Feb. 2020); Jaeah Lee, Wait, Banks Can Shut Off My Car?, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 2016),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/04/subprime-car-loans-starter-interrupt/ (noting that
SIDs became more useful in the early 2000s, when GPS tracking allowed for easier repossession).
167. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Miss a Payment? Good Luck Moving That
Car, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/miss-a-paymentgood-luck-moving-that-car/ (detailing how SIDs work).
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turned off while they are at work or away from their homes, or even while
idling at stoplights, stranding them wherever they happen to be. 168
Additionally, people have reported their cars being disabled at inopportune
times, such as when they need to take their kids to the emergency room.169
Recent advances in technology also allow lenders to send payment
reminders by setting the device to beep “incessantly” when the loan’s due
date draws near,170 to require that people input a code every month to operate
their vehicles,171 to receive reports about the customers’ driving habits,172 and
to control vehicles through the SID. 173 For example, PassTime’s TRAX
program, which is marketed to auto lenders and Buy Here Pay Here auto
dealers includes pinpointed GPS tracking, geo-fencing, and starter
interrupters, all “designed to mitigate the risk of financing, help keep assets
secure, and make repossession simple.”174
SIDs increase the effectiveness of repossessions and afford creditors
increased control over customers’ mobility. Given this, it makes sense that
subprime auto lenders and Buy Here Pay Here auto dealers were the first
wide-spread adopters of SIDs. 175 In 2014, reports stated that two million
vehicles had SIDs installed in them. 176 And in 2016, PassTime’s CEO
estimated that 70% of vehicles sold via subprime financing come with
SIDs.177
In reaction to consumers’ experiences with SIDs, a handful of states have
enacted regulations that require lenders and dealers to notify customers that
SIDs are installed in the purchased vehicles and, in some instances, prohibit
the stopping of a vehicle if doing so will pose a danger to its occupants.178
168. See id. (recounting the story of a car being disabled while idling at a stop light).
169. See id. (recounting the story of the disabling of Chrysler van when a customer’s daughter
needed to get to the emergency room); Robert Szypko, Your Car Won’t Start. Did You Make The
Loan Payment?, NPR (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/10/16/
356693782/your-car-wont-start-did-you-make-the-loan-payment (discussing experiences with
SIDs).
170. Lee, supra note 166; see also Szypko, supra note 168.
171. See Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 167, at 4.
172. See Chris Woodyard & Jayne O’Donnell, Your Car May Be Invading Your Privacy, USA
TODAY (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/03/24/car-spying-edrdata-privacy/1991751/ (discussing “connected cars” as they emerged more on the scene).
173. See Dr Swati Subodh, Internet of Things — Leap Towards A Hyper-Connected World,
MEDIUM (May 10, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/internet-of-things-leap-towards-a-hyperconnected-world-6b6a90960a06 (discussing advances in connected technology generally); ELVY,
supra note 58, at chapter 4 (overviewing SIDs).
174. TRAX GPS Vehicle Tracking System, PASSTIME, https://passtimegps.com/solutions/trax/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020). Geo-fencing allows a lender or dealer to set a geographic area for a
vehicle. If the vehicle exits this area, the lender or dealer receives a notification and potentially can
disable it. See ELVY, supra note 58, at chapter 4 (overviewing geo-tracking).
175. See Szypko, supra note 169 (noting industry adoption of SIDs).
176. See Corkery & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 167.
177. See Lee, supra note 166 (noting PassTime’s CEO representations).
178. See Elaine S. Povich, Late Payment? A ‘Kill Switch’ Can Strand You and Your Car, PEW
TRUSTS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
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Even with these regulations in place, Buy Here Pay Here dealers and
subprime auto lenders praise SIDs as enabling people to purchase cars when
they otherwise could not get an auto loan with their credit score and
history.179 They also contend that SIDs allow them to extend loans with lower
interest rates because of their increased ability to successfully repossess cars
while reducing repossessions by enabling negotiations between delinquent
consumers and lenders.180
Nonetheless, the subprime auto loan industry is growing, and interest
rates are not declining. The purported benefits from SIDs and easier
repossessions seemingly have not accrued to borrowers. The opposite
appears to have occurred. Easy repossession of vehicles has encouraged auto
lenders to engage in “repossession remarketing,” in which lenders sell
repossessed cars as quickly as possible without reconditioning the
vehicles.181 The lack of robust laws and regulations protecting consumers has
allowed lenders to streamline the repossession and sale process, making it
profitable.182
Once the lender sells the repossessed vehicle, if the sale price was less
than the amount the consumer owed on the vehicle, in most states, the lender
can also bring a lawsuit to collect the deficiency.183 Deficiency judgments
often accompany these sales even if the repossessed and sold vehicle was
worth more than loan amount outstanding because repossession and sale can
bring over $1,000 in fees added to the amount due from the consumer.184 If a
consumer does not pay the deficiency award, the auto lender can sue the
consumer again for payment or sell the deficiency award debt to a collection
agency.185 Studies estimate that debt collectors prevail in more than 95% of

2018/11/27/late-payment-a-kill-switch-can-strand-you-and-your-car
(overviewing
states’
legislation). Lenders and dealers have responded to this legislation by providing customers with
disclosures and requiring them to sign agreements that waive lenders’ and dealers’ responsibility
due to interruptions (and similar) caused by SIDs. See ELVY, supra note 58, at chapter 4
(overviewing how lenders and dealers have responded to state legislation).
179. See Povich, supra note 177 (discussing the comments of an attorney at a “law firm that
specializes in advising companies on how to comply with consumer law”).
180. See id.
181. Repos Remain Stable, supra note 158.
182. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 21–22.
183. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, The Car Was Repossessed, but the Debt
Remains, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/business/dealbook/
car-loan-subprime.html. A few states prohibit or limit deficiency lawsuits for auto loans. Jim
Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
535, 586 (2012) (discussing state statutes).
184. See Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Burden of Debt on Black America, ATLANTIC (Oct.
9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/debt-black-families/409756/
(telling the story of someone charged $1,100 in fees for the repossession and sale of her vehicle).
185. See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 182 (describing how “Portfolio Recovery
Associates, one of the nation’s largest debt buyers, purchased about $30.2 million of auto
deficiencies in the first quarter of [2017], up from $411,000 just a year earlier”).
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suits against consumers.186 Deficiency and debt collection suits thus further
increase lenders’ return on repossession and incentive to repossess.
Lenders generally sell repossessed vehicles to wholesale buyers—used
auto dealers—who mark-up and quickly resell the cars to consumers after
“light cosmetic work,” similarly making their sales profitable.187 Increases in
repossessions also have fostered a side-industry in flipping used cars,
evidencing the fruitfulness of reselling used automobiles. 188 Given these
dynamics, of the parties involved in the auto sale and lending industry, the
consumer is the only one who regularly loses.
For some, local governments add a layer of worry about auto
repossession. Many cities depend on revenue from parking tickets and other
fees to fund their budgets.189 If people do not pay those tickets and other fees,
the city has the option to tow their vehicles to an impound lot. 190 Local
governments can also suspend drivers’ licenses if people do not pay fees and
fines, such as traffic tickets.191 If the impounded vehicles are not claimed, the
city can sell them at an auction.192 Because of economic and racial and ethnic
disparities in where people live and their ability to purchase parking insulated
from ticketing and towing, this practice of impounding and selling vehicles
disproportionately has affected people with lower incomes and communities
of color.193
186. See A POUND OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PRIVATE DEBT, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION 5 (2018), https://www.aclu.org/report/pound-flesh-criminalization-private-debt; How Debt
Collectors Are Transforming the Business of State Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 15-17 (May
2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/05/debt_collectors_to_consumers.pdf.
187. Repos Remain Stable, supra note 158.
188. See Flipping Cars - How It’s Done, AUTOLIST (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.autolist.com/
guides/flipping-cars (noting that cars found at auctions can include lender repossessed cars).
189. See Michael Maciag, Special Report: How Autonomous Vehicles Could Constrain City
Budgets, GOVERNING (July 31, 2017), https://www.governing.com/gov-data/gov-how-autonomous
-vehicles-could-effect-city-budgets.html (noting that “New York and Chicago derive more revenue
from parking fines than from parking fee collections”).
190. See, e.g., John Bryne, Lawsuit: Chicago’s Practice of Selling Impounded Cars Is
Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIBUNE (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ctchicago-towed-cars-sold-lawsuit-20200226-vlg7bpqk6ve23drftwqaj2ensi-story.html;
Dorian
Hargrove et al., City Has Towed Thousands of Vehicles, Some Considered People’s Homes, Because
of Unpaid Parking Tickets, NBC SAN DIEGO (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/
news/local/city-towed-vehicles-unpaid-parking-tickets/128445/; C.J. Ciaramella, Chicago Is
Trying to Pay Down Its Debt by Impounding Innocent People’s Cars, REASON (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://reason.com/2018/04/25/chicago-debt-impound-cars-innocent/.
191. See generally William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical
Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585 (2020) (empirically
investigating the suspension of drivers’ licenses because of failure to pay fees and fines).
192. See Flipping Cars – How It’s Done, supra note 187 (noting who sells vehicles at public
auctions).
193. See Towed into Debt: How Towing Practices in California Punish Poor People, W. CTR.
ON L. & POL’Y 29 (Mar. 18, 2019), https://wclp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TowedIntoDebt.
Report.pdf (noting that towing “disproportionately impact[s] unhoused people, immigrants, and
people of color”). Communities of color also face higher rates of debt collection. See Paul Kiel &
Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Black Neighborhoods,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collection-lawsuits-squeeze-
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In sum, technological advances in auto monitoring and repossession have
made people’s car ownership more precarious, regardless of whether they
used a traditional or cutting-edge vehicle loan to buy the car. There are few
options for consumers who fear defaulting or who have defaulted on their
auto loans, and the threat of repossession and sale of their cars is real. The
next Part details how the consumer bankruptcy system can help people stop
repossessions and try to keep their cars during financially precarious times.
III FILIN

ANKRUPTCY TO KEEP E ICLES

For people worried that their lenders are about to repossess their cars or
whose cars have been repossessed or impounded, filing bankruptcy offers
people a way to stop repossessions, deal with their car loans, and get their
cars back. Given the limited options for consumers to negotiate with lenders
once they have purchased vehicles, filing bankruptcy may be people’s
leading option to keep their cars. In some circumstances, filing bankruptcy
may be people’s only option to keep their cars if auto dealers are intent that
they “kick the trade.”194 Yet “kicking the trade” will be undesirable for some
people because they may not want to swap vehicles, particularly if doing so
will result in higher loan payments for a vehicle that is worth less than their
current car.
All bankruptcy proceedings come with the automatic stay, which
prevents creditors from collecting amounts owed from the debtor or the
debtor’s property.195 The automatic stay thus stops collection of auto debt,
including repossession of vehicles and sales of already repossessed vehicles.
With the automatic stay in place, bankruptcy provides ways for people to get
current on their auto loans. After detailing how people can use bankruptcy to
deal with issues with their cars, this Part discusses City of Chicago v. Fulton,
a case involving the automatic stay that the Supreme Court decided in
January 2021. 196 This case’s outcome decreases the usefulness of the
automatic stay with regards to auto loans, which could further shift the
balance of power from consumers to lenders.
A STAYIN CURRENT ON AUTO LOANS
In addition to the automatic stay, bankruptcy can help people keep cars
by providing options to make auto loan payments manageable. People
generally file under one of two bankruptcy chapters, chapter 7 or chapter
13.197 In chapter 7, consumer debtors with cars encumbered by loans have
black-neighborhoods. Black and Latinx individuals also are overrepresented among people with
suspended licenses for failure to pay traffic tickets or to appear in court. Crozier & Garrett, supra
note 190, at 1589–90.
194. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
195. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 303–04 (discussing the automatic stay).
196. See supra note 48.
197. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 299.
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four options. First, they can surrender the car and discharge unsecured debt
that remains after the car value is offset against the auto loan amount due.198
Data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), a long-term project
studying people who file bankruptcy, on which I am a co-investigator,199
show that chapter 7 debtors who come to bankruptcy with two or more cars
often surrender their least valuable vehicle, and keep more valuable, likely
newer, more reliable cars that they use every day.200
The remaining options allow people to keep cars they need. People can
redeem their vehicle by paying the value of the car to the auto lender, as
opposed to the entire remainder of the loan, as is required outside of
bankruptcy.201 Redemption thus allows that debtor to discharge the amount
an auto loan is outstanding above their vehicle’s value. Data from the CBP
show that very few consumer debtors redeem their cars—less than 2% of
chapter 7 debtors who come to bankruptcy with cars.202
People also can reaffirm the auto debt, whereby they essentially waive
the discharge as to that secured debt and enter into a new agreement with the
lender to pay the debt going forward, post-bankruptcy.203 This means that the
auto loan continues according to the new agreement outside bankruptcy. CBP
data show that two-thirds of people who enter bankruptcy with cars indicate
that they intend to reaffirm their auto loan as to their most valuable vehicle.
That percentage drops to 58% for people’s second most valuable vehicle.204
Finally, debtors can choose to deal with their cars and car loans through
a supposedly legally prohibited fourth choice—ride-through. 205 Ridethrough refers to the practice of consumer and auto lenders continuing to pay
and enforce pre-bankruptcy loans after chapter 7 proceedings conclude.206
Creditors seemingly are willing to accept continued payment postbankruptcy, as long as debtors keep current on the auto loan. People, in turn,
are more likely to keep current on their auto loans because chapter 7 allows
them to discharge most of their unsecured debts, freeing up money postbankruptcy.207
In general, for individuals and couples who want to save one or two
essential cars, the benefit of filing chapter 7 primarily is the discharge of most
unsecured debts and, to a lesser extent, the ability to abandon other unneeded
198. See id. at 300–01.
199. Id. at 304–06 (detailing the CBP). For more details about the CBP, see Consumer
Bankruptcy Project, http://www.consumerbankruptcyproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
200. Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 312–13 (reporting intentions to surrender).
201. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (allowing the redemption of “tangible personal property intended primarily
for personal, family, or household use” by paying the “secured claim”).
202. Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 313 fig.1 (reporting intentions to redeem vehicles).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2019); see also Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 301.
204. Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 313 fig.1 (reporting intentions to reaffirm).
205. See id. at 301–02 (discussing how ride-through is prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, but
that debtors and their creditors still use this tactic to keep vehicles).
206. See id. (discussing the mechanics of ride-through).
207. See id. at 324–25 (discussing the benefits of filing bankruptcy to keep cars).
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vehicles. As my co-authors and I discuss in Driven to Bankruptcy, people
who are worried about defaulting on car loans may find that paying an
attorney to help them file a chapter 7 case costs less and brings less
uncertainty about whether they will have a car when they need it than
“kicking the trade.”208 This is true even though consumer debtor attorneys’
charge $1,200 or more to file a chapter 7 case.209
When it comes to keeping cars, chapter 13, in contrast, seems like a less
desirable deal. In chapter 13, the debtor must propose a three- to five-year
repayment plan that pays their secured debts on an ongoing basis, which
includes interest payments, and also pays accrued past-due amounts and
related fees.210 The “secured claim” people must pay generally is the value of
the collateral, which allows debtors to “strip down” underwater property,
breaking the creditor’s claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim.
For cars, however, the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) includes a special
provision that applies to purchase-money security interests in motor vehicles
bought within 910 days (i.e., two and a half years) before the bankruptcy
filing. This provision requires that the plan payments account for the full
amount of the auto debt, not just the value of the collateral, thereby
disallowing strip down.211 Because the secured debt on cars that people have
owned for a longer time generally will have amortized to at or below the
value of the car, chapter 13 plans require people to pay the total amount due
on their auto loans.212 But, importantly for debtors, they can use their cars
during the pendency of their chapter 13 cases.213
Chapter 13 debtors must complete their plans to get a debt discharge.214
Yet, two-thirds of filers either request that case be dismissed or be converted
to chapter 7 before their plans end.215 Because few debtors request to convert
their cases to chapter 7, more than half of people who file chapter 13 do not
receive a discharge.216
The inability to strip down auto loans, combined with the low plan
completion and discharge rate makes chapter 13 seem like a less desirable
deal for people who want to use bankruptcy to help with auto loans. In
addition, consumer bankruptcy attorneys charge their debtor clients
208. See id.
209. Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, Life in the
Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219, 229 (2018) (reporting that chapter 7 attorneys’ fees
averaged $1,224 in 2017); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah
Thorne, “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (finding that chapter 7
attorneys’ fees averaged $1,229 in 2015).
210. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 302–03 (discussing secured claims in chapter 13).
211. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2020); see Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 302–03 (discussing
this provision, termed the “hanging paragraph,” and defining purchase money security interests).
212. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 302–03 (discussing amortization of auto loans).
213. See id. (discussing chapter 13).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2018).
215. See Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, supra note 208, at 227 (detailing studies).
216. Foohey et al., “No Money Down”, supra note 208, at 1093 tbl.5 (reporting on CBP data).
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significantly more to help with a chapter 13 case—an average of about
$3,450.217 The difference in attorneys’ fees between chapters 7 and 13 may
make filing chapter 13 to keep a car rather than finding another vehicle
economically inefficient.218
Nonetheless, in Driven to Bankruptcy, my co-authors and I found that a
significant group of people file chapter 13 owning cars and little else. 219
These people have unique characteristics other than their lack of
homeownership. They make less income than other debtors, their cars are
worth more than other debtors’ vehicles, and they owe more on those cars
than other debtors.220 Black households are also more likely to be among
debtors who file chapter 13 owning little other than cars. 221 The lower
income, higher car value, and lower car equity aligns with research showing
that minorities pay more for cars and auto loans.222
In discussing these results, we highlight that Black Americans bring to
bankruptcy the discrimination that they experience outside of bankruptcy. To
the extent that they file chapter 13 to hold onto cars, they likewise pay more
trying to do that and probably are less likely to succeed in doing so as
compared to other Americans. Given racial disparities in auto repossession
and the incurrence of parking tickets and other government fees and fines,
Black households are also presumably more likely to file bankruptcy to get
back booted, repossessed, or impounded vehicles.223
ETTIN

ACK REPOSSESSED CARS

Although chapter 7 overall seems like the better deal for people to keep
their cars, chapter 13 is particularly useful to deal with already repossessed
and impounded vehicles. The automatic stay that activates upon filing
prevents creditors from continuing with car repossessions and sales.224 The
stay is useful to people who file chapter 7 or chapter 13. In chapter 7, debtors
can get cars back if they agree to redeem or reaffirm the auto debts.225 But
filing chapter 13, and only chapter 13, brings additional benefits for getting

217. Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, supra note 208, at 229 (reporting attorneys’ fees in 2017).
218. The difference in cost as compared to attorneys’ fees to file a chapter 7 case relates to chapter
13’s relative complexity. See id. at n.54.
219. Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 316–20 (detailing the results of a cluster analysis of
people who file bankruptcy owning cars).
220. Id. at 318, tbl.3.
221. Id. at 318, tbl.3, 316–20.
222. See id. at 323; supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 163 and 192 and accompanying text; Melissa Sanchez & Sandhya
Kambhampati, Driven into Debt: How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into Bankruptcy,
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chicago-ticket-debtbankruptcy/ (discussing how governmental fees lead people in Chicago to file chapter 13).
224. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
225. See Foohey et al., Driven, supra note 2, at 303–04 (discussing how bankruptcy can help
debtors combat repossessions).
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vehicles back and dealing with government fees and fines and suspended
drivers’ licenses.
The additional benefits in chapter 13 for getting vehicle back relate to the
automatic stay and other provisions regarding property of the estate. Prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision in January 2021 in City of Chicago v. Fulton,
a case coming out of Chicago’s practice of impounding vehicles for unpaid
parking tickets and other fees,226 courts were split on whether the automatic
stay required immediate return of repossessed but not yet sold collateral upon
commencement of a bankruptcy. A majority of courts had held that a specific
sub-provision of the automatic stay which referenced “exercis[ing] control
over property of the estate” 227 required creditors, debt collectors, and
government units to return repossessed but not yet sold vehicles to debtors.
Importantly, these courts read this return as automatic and immediate upon
commencement of a chapter 13 case. The debtor did not need to file a motion
to compel the return of the vehicle.228 In contrast, a minority of courts had
held that to get back repossessed collateral, such as a car, the debtor was
required to file a motion seeking that the bankruptcy court compel turnover
and possibly also require the debtor to pay the creditor “adequate protection”
to guard against the collateral’s decline in value.229
In light of this circuit split, at the end of 2019, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on Fulton.230 The issues in the case transcended how the automatic
stay applies to debtors getting their cars back from debt collectors and the
impound lot post-petition.231 As such, the Court focused on a textual reading
226. See SCOTUSblog Chicago v. Fulton docket, supra note 48.
227. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
228. See, e.g., Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that creditors must turn over property upon commencement of a bankruptcy case); Cal.
Emp’t Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
retention of estate property violates the automatic stay); Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d
72 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a secured creditor violated the automatic stay when it did not return
a repossessed vehicle to a chapter 13 debtor); City of Chic. v. Fulton (In re Fulton), 926 F.3d 916
(7th Cir. 2019) (holding that once a debtor files bankruptcy, a city (here, Chicago) cannot “continue
to hold a debtor’s vehicle until the debtor pays her outstanding parking tickets”).
229. See, e.g., WD Equip. v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that
a secured creditor only must return a vehicle to a chapter 13 debtor if the court grants the debtor’s
motion for turnover); In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 130 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he turnover
provision is effectuated by virtue of judicial action.”). In those jurisdictions that require return of a
seized vehicle, the secured auto lender can ask the bankruptcy court to order the debtor to pay
adequate protection prior to when the debtor begins making payments in advance of or under the
repayment plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d), 1326(a) (2018).
230. See SCOTUSblog Chicago v. Fulton docket, supra note 48.
231. For a summary of the issues and different analyses, compare Brief of Amici Curiae
Professors John A. E. Pottow and Jay Lawrence Westbrook In Support of Respondents (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-357/137871/20200311160642592_19357_Brief%20of%20Amici%20Curiae.pdf (arguing that the Supreme Court should reject
arguments about distinctions embedded in the language of § 362(a)(3) regarding control versus
possession of collateral and also consider the “background context of bankruptcy practice”) and
Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors As Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-357/137609/20200310092833691_19-
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of the Code to decide the issue. It unanimously sided with the minority of
courts in holding that this specific sub-provision on the automatic stay does
not require creditors to return property to the estate (to be returned to the
debtor by the trustee) merely because they had possession of the property
when the debtor filed bankruptcy. If a creditor takes affirmative action to
disturb the status quo of who holds property of the estate post-petition, such
may constitute a violation of the automatic stay.232
Given that Fulton involved impounding of vehicles, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor wrote a concurrence to comment on how debtors can get vehicles
out of the impound lot or back from their creditors in chapter 13. The solution
is for the debtor to file a motion seeking a court order for the vehicle’s return
under the Code’s turnover provision.233 In addition to the turnover motion,
bankruptcy courts may require the debtor to prove that the secured creditor
is “adequately protected,” which may require paying on the car loan as part
of the turnover.234
As Justice Sotomayor notes, needing to file a turnover motion
significantly decreases the usefulness of filing chapter 13 to get back
repossessed vehicles. Requesting turnover requires initiating a separate
proceeding within the bankruptcy case that “can be quite slow” and adds
cost.235 Even if a debtor files the motion at the same time as the petition and
asks for an expedited hearing, a month or more likely will pass before the
judge issues an order for the vehicle’s turnover. 236 Justice Sotomayor
estimates that without an expedited hearing, turnover could take 100 days.237
People need their cars immediately. Waiting even a week, let alone three
months, to get back their car back could mean losing a job or having to forego
important medical care. Even if debtors can wait a month or more to get cars
back, they may not be able to pay their attorneys the additional money
required to draft, submit, and defend turnover motions.238 Or they may not
357%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Bankruptcy%20Law%20Professors.pdf (similar), with Brief
for Amici Curiae Professors Ralph Brubaker, Ronald J. Mann, Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Thomas E.
Plank and Charles J. Tabb In Support of Petitioners (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
DocketPDF/19/19-357/132348/20200207142219207_19357%20City%20of%20Chicago%20v%20Fulton%20Brief%20for%20Amici%20Curiae%20Profe
ssors%20in%20Support%20of%20Petitioner.pdf (arguing that requiring turnover without a motion
from the debtor is inconsistent with the Code).
232. See generally City of Chi., Ill. v. Fulton, supra note 48.
233. Id. at pp. 3−5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
234. City of Chi., Ill. v. Fulton, supra note 48, at p. 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
235. Id. at pp. 4−5 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
236. A relevant comparison for timing is “first-day” motions in business bankruptcy cases, which
are among the fastest-heard motions by bankruptcy courts and still can take a week or more from
filing to hearing to issued order. See ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 413–17 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing “first day orders”).
237. City of Chi., Ill. v. Fulton, supra note 48, at p. 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
238. In chapter 13, attorneys’ fees can be paid through the repayment plan, which may reduce the
immediate cost concern. See Foohey et al., “No Money Down”, supra note 208, at 1066–70
(discussing the timing of payment of attorneys’ fees).
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have enough money to pay adequate protection between the time that the car
is returned and when the Code requires repayment plan payments to begin.239
Regardless, the motion that Fulton now requires will increase the relatively
high costs associated with a chapter 13 case. For some people, abandoning a
repossessed vehicle and purchasing another, despite the cost, may be less
expensive than filing chapter 13 to save the vehicle.
At the same time, based on the above discussions, people may experience
increased repossession of their cars because of fintech advances in vehicle
tracking, combined with changes in the auto loan market brought by other
fintech advances. Prior to Fulton, filing chapter 13 may have been people’s
leading option if lenders already had repossessed their cars. In the wake of
Fulton, what little leverage consumers had via the bankruptcy system
diminished, which could change the dynamics of repossession even further
in favor of dealers and lenders.
C DEALIN WIT FEES AND LICENSE SUSPENSIONS
For some people, filing chapter 13 brings even more benefits related to
vehicles. It presents a viable option to deal with traffic tickets and other
governmental fees and fines that can lead to booting of vehicles and
suspension of licenses, debts which are not dischargeable in chapter 7. In
chapter 7, nondischargeable debts include “a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit.”240 In contrast, chapter
13 provides what is termed the “superdischarge,” which includes amounts
due to government units, except those that provide for restitution or are a
criminal fine. 241 Chapter 13’s discharge, and again only chapter 13’s
discharge, gets rid of parking and other tickets. This allows debtors to
reinstate their drivers’ licenses.242
This alone may push some people to file chapter 13. Because
communities of color are subject to heightened policing, including traffic and
parking tickets, if they turn to bankruptcy for help, they will find that filing
chapter 13 is their only actual option.243 If these debtors also need to get their
vehicles back, post-Fulton, they will pay even more to file a motion seeking
return.244 Fulton has the potential to shift the power balance between people
and state and local governments that rely on driving to make money. The
239. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (providing that payments must start 30 days after filing of the petition
or when the repayment plan is confirmed, whichever is earlier).
240. Id. § 523(a)(7) (providing for the discharge of debt owed to a governmental unit if it is for
compensation of “actual pecuniary loss”).
241. Id. § 1328(a)(3).
242. See Pamela Foohey, Fines, Fees, And Filing Bankruptcy, 98 N.C. L. REV. 419, 421–23
(2020) (discussing discharge in chapter 7 and chapter 13); Stephen G. Murphy & Allen Rosenberg,
Driver’s License Suspensions for Delinquent Taxes and Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July
2013, at 18, 19.
243. See supra note 222.
244. See supra Part III.B.
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costs of this shift will fall disproportionately on communities of color, either
in increased bankruptcy fees or the need to allocate money to pay fines and
fees. Given that it is federal, state, and local governments’ cumulative and
continued decisions to elevate driving as the form of transportation people
must use to reliably get to work, school, and elsewhere, it seems ironic that
the government may profit even more from its decisions under Fulton.
As Justice Sotomayor ended her concurrence by noting, the solution as
to bankruptcy is for Congress to pass a statutory fix “either by ensuring that
expedited review is available for [turnover] of a vehicle or by enacting
entirely new statutory mechanisms that require creditors to return cars to
debtors in a timely manner.” 245 More broadly, that the consumer bankruptcy
system offers a leading—perhaps the leading—way for people to deal with
the power imbalance they face in obtaining automobiles is a symptom of the
larger problem developing in the auto buying and lending market. That
Fulton may have reverberating effects on people’s car ownership almost
certainly was not anticipated by the Code’s drafters. Bankruptcy is not the
place to deal with the ongoing shifting of power from consumers in favor of
auto dealers and lenders. More comprehensive, non-bankruptcy solutions are
needed to give consumers some control over purchasing and otherwise
accessing cars, particularly if the government continues to prioritize driving
as America’s primary mode of transportation.
I

ALI NIN

POWER DYNAMICS IN AUTO LOANS

Accumulating changes in the auto buying and lending market seem to be
on a path to continue to decrease consumer power and welfare. If driving
remains the dominant form of transportation for most Americans, changes in
the market for cars and auto loans will become increasingly problematic for
people. There is no indication, at present, that federal, state, and local
governments will take meaningful steps to shift focus from prioritizing and
subsidizing driving to other forms of transportation. People will continue to
need access to automobiles. Indeed, with the social distancing that will likely
be part of American life for many months, a lasting effect of COVID-19 may
make people more comfortable with driving and even more dependent on
cars.246 In turn, regulators and policy makers will have even less incentive to
allocate resources to supporting mass transit options or to urban planning
designed so that people will not need to be so car dependent.
Although there always will be people who make the difficult decision not
to purchase or lease vehicles because of the cost, which may lead to assertions
that other people who get in over their heads financially with auto loans do
245. City of Chi., Ill. v. Fulton, supra note 48, at pp. 5−6 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
246. As cities began to reopen in June 2020, officials worried that people would avoid public
transportation in favor of driving cars. See Christina Goldbaum, Can 8 Million Daily Riders Be
Lured Back To N.Y. Mass Transit?, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/01/nyregion/coronavirus-commute-nyc-subway-cars.html.

15]

Consumers’ Declining Power in the Fintech Auto Loan Market

41

not deserve sympathy or help, there are at least a couple key reasons to
advocate for some sort of government intervention in the market. First, how
people purchase and lease automobiles, at present, sets this type of debt apart
from almost every other consumer debt.247 Adopting regulations that parallel
those already in place for other consumer credit products would put people
on similar footing with lenders as they are now in similar credit transactions.
Second, the government’s creation and maintenance of a transportation
structure that forces most people to rely heavily on cars arguably is a
sufficient reason to re-allocate some power away from auto lenders. There
are a variety of ways to do so, including direct intervention in the form of
public-backed loans or direct subsidies for automobiles. The remainder of
this Part discusses the merits and potential problems of these interventions.
As noted, other than homes, auto loans are the only other type of secured
debt that most people will incur. Student loans, credit cards, medical debt,
and other leading types of consumer debt are unsecured. Lenders cannot
reach people’s assets without going through at least some court
proceedings.248 The security that accompanies auto loans allows lenders or
debt collectors to immediately seize people’s vehicles, distinguishing the
timing of auto repossession from that of home foreclosure, which can take
weeks or months.249 Additionally, the recent integration of fintech advances
in auto loans largely gives lenders a greater ability to set the terms of auto
loans.
Ideas for how to put people on similar footing with auto lenders as they
have in comparable credit transactions can be drawn from already
implemented consumer protections for other consumer credit products, such
as home loans and credit cards. As an added benefit, these protections will be
easier-to-implement given that they already have been rolled out with these
other credit products. Protections provided for other consumer credit
products generally require lenders to assess people’s ability to pay, to provide
understandable disclosures, to limit fees and other charges that accompany
the loan, including upon default, and to allow rescission under particular
circumstances.250 Ability to pay standards would respond to the argument
247. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
248. These primarily are state court debt collection actions that can end with seizure of nonexempt assets (to the extent that a debtor has any non-exempt assets), with garnishment of a bank
account, or with wage garnishment. The debt collection market currently has serious power
imbalances that are beyond the scope of this article. See generally Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez
& Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection Pandemic, 11 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 222, 224–25
(2020) (discussing how COVID-19 could increase debt collection); How Debt Collectors Are
Transforming the Business of State Courts, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 6, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2020/05/how-debt-collectors-aretransforming-the-business-of-state-courts (discussing debt collection proceedings).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22; Parts III and IV.
250. For instance, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009
(CARD Act) imposed pricing controls, limits on marketing, and other necessary disclosures on
credit card issuers. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and
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that auto lenders should not sell people loans if they should have been
concerned about people’s financial outlooks. Other regulations would put the
burden on people to recognize that a deal is financially infeasible, but would
try to make it easier for them to do so. For instance, a couple of states have
adopted or proposed disclosures specific to auto lending, such as Texas’s
motor vehicle installment sale form which includes language about the
possibility of markup.251
Other potential protections include enhancements to federal and state
laws regarding debt collection and credit reporting that would apply
specifically to auto loans. As with houses, and as already provided in a
handful of states, auto repossession could be subject to a time period during
which people could reinstate their loans.252 And, as recently mentioned by
Levitin, another set of reforms could target auto lending specific practices,
such as outlawing certain loan packages, “yo-yo” schemes, and some
transaction fees.253
As Levitin and others have pointed out, however, these purported
consumer protections are unlikely to operate as actual protections in the auto
market. Beyond the unique linking of auto sales and lending that may make
it more difficult for people to separate the terms of the financing from the
terms of the sale, 254 people’s need for cars often will transcend such
disclosures and regulations. As research in high-cost lending has
demonstrated, people who need money for necessities operate under
conditions of little choice, whether that be actual or perceived.255 The same
likely is true for people desperate to buy or lease cars. To the extent that
people read disclosures, they may disregard them, not because they do not
understand the potentially problematic terms they are agreeing to, but
because they live in a country where they have few other reliable
transportation options. With the addition of fintech platforms that aggregate
auto loans, to the extent that people can shop around for loans, they may be
less likely to do so particularly if the app shows them variations in loan
pricing.256 Even if people try to shop around for auto loans, they will find

Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 974, 977–78 (2012) (discussing pricing controls); Jim Hawkins,
The CARD Act on Campus, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471, 1473, 1476, 1498 (2012) (discussing
marketing and other disclosures); see also Levitin, supra note 6, at 1297 n.164 (proposing and
discussing a right of rescission for auto finance transactions and noting that this exists for mortgage
loans).
251. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1297 n.164 (discussing using disclosures to provide consumers
with more power in auto buying and lending transactions).
252. See supra note 22.
253. See Levitin, supra note 6, at Part IV; supra note 55 (discussing “yo-yo” scams).
254. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 1307 and see accompanying text at Part IV (opining that
proposals need to address “the root cause of the problems in the auto lending market—the market
structure in which vehicle purchases are effectively tied with vehicle financing”).
255. See text accompanying notes 99–103.
256. See text accompanying note 65.
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lenders coalescing around offering products with high interest rates and long
loan lengths.257
Less scrupulous auto lenders may be incentivized to operate in the grayer
areas of regulations or disregard them entirely, such as ability to pay
requirements, because customers are likely to agree to unbalanced terms.
Given that state attorneys general and the FTC have brought actions against
and raised concerns about auto lenders, this unfortunate outcome should be
anticipated.258 Overall, the United States’ decisions to elevate driving over
other forms of transportation will likely render programs, policies, and laws
that seek to foster competition in the auto market ineffective.259
At this point, it is worth reiterating that there always will be people who
find a way to live “car free” while others take out and then default on auto
loans. But the core of this Article suggests that there are two forces at work
in the auto sale and loan market. One is the increasing intertwining of car
sales and loans in light of fintech advances, leading to greater concerns that
lenders work for their dealer-customers rather than for end-user consumers.
This alone may support additional interventions or regulation of the auto loan
market.
The other dynamic is public policies that, across the board, continue to
make America a country of cars, which is the dynamic that is likely to render
regulations ineffective. Cars have become essential goods that operate as part
of America’s infrastructure. That is, they are necessities. But people have
been left to privately fund their purchases. The solution may be more direct
public intervention in the marketplace, as is done with other necessities.
Taking America’s chosen transportation infrastructure as a given,260 with
people continuing to have to purchase cars in the private market, direct
intervention may take two primary forms: public-backed loans and direct
subsidies. Public-backed loans would allow people to purchase automobiles.
257. See text accompanying notes 51–52.
258. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the FTC’s action against Uber); supra note 68 (discussing
action against subprime lender Santander).
259. Levitin proposes de-linking vehicle purchasing from vehicle financing because “[t]he linked
nature of the financing transaction means that it is not subject to normal competitive pressures.
Instead of lenders competing for the consumer’s business, they are competing for the dealer’s
business.” Levitin, supra note 6, at Part V. Although, as Levitin suggests, this might create “more
robust competition for consumers’ financing business,” id., if people continue to need vehicles
above almost all other consumer goods, the incremental benefit from this greater competition may
not be sufficient to offset lenders’ ability and incentive to extract expensive and problematic
concessions from consumers. That is, the power imbalances in the auto marketplace go beyond
changes in how dealers and lenders interact to the detriment of consumers.
260. Discussing how governments could reallocate funds to provide transportation and other
infrastructure that would decrease people’s need for automobiles is beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, this Article largely presumes that driving will remain people’s primary mode of
transportation. For more detailed discussion about the benefits of providing people with true
alternatives to driving automobiles, see generally Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, supra note
3 and Pamela Foohey, Bursting the Auto Loan Bubble In the Wake of COVID-19, 106 IOWA L. REV.
__ (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3737513.
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This loan program could also include an income-based repayment option for
auto loans for people who cannot meet loans’ current terms, similar to the
current income-based repayment program offered for federal student loans.261
The public-loan market may be marginally subsidized, offering people lowerthan-market interest rates and fees. In concept, even without subsidization, a
public loan option may provide the needed disaggregation from auto selling
and auto lending, as well as entry of a large, business-like market participant
(the government), that will give consumers more power in auto buying and
lending.
Similar government programs, however, tell a cautionary tale about the
potential effectiveness of this solution in shifting market power toward
consumers. The student loan market has already test-driven a public-backed
loan structure, to increasingly costly consequences. Rather than decrease the
cost of education and provide Americans with a path toward personal
advancement, the availability of subsidized and unsubsidized federal student
loans has ballooned into a $1.5 trillion market that threatens the economy and
contributes to the widening racial wealth gap. 262 The Department of
Education’s student loan income-based repayment and loan forgiveness
programs likewise have largely been deemed failures by scholars and
consumer advocates.263
There are, of course, differences between auto loans and student loans.
Student loans are less likely to be underwritten. Yet, basic underwriting for
auto loans has led to a proliferation of subprime loans and rising
delinquencies, an eventual result that may transfer to a public-backed market.
Also, the failure of the student loan income-based repayment and loan
forgiveness payments in part may be attributable to inept administration.264
261. Income-Driven Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manageloans/repayment/plans/income-driven (last visited June 2, 2020).
262. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, How Wiping Out $1.5 Trillion In Student Debt Would Boost The
Economy, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-wiping-out15-trillion-in-student-debt-would-boost-the-economy-2019-09-09; Foohey & Martin, supra note
13, at Part III.B (discussing how student loan debt is linked with income and wealth inequality);
Dalié Jiménez & Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt is a Civil Rights Issue: The Case for Debt Relief
and Higher Education Reform, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.132, 140–61 (2020) (detailing the
history of higher education finance and how the increased costs of student loans for communities of
color intersects with the racial wealth gap).
263. See, e.g., Frank A. Pasquale, Democratizing Higher Education: Defending and Extending
Income-Based Repayment Programs, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2015) (critiquing incomebased repayment plans for student loans); Tyler Curtis & Alan White, What’s Wrong with Public
Service Loan Forgiveness and How to Fix It, working paper (draft dated Nov. 18, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478855 (detailing the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program); Tara
Siegel Bernard, The Should-Be Solution to the Student-Debt Problem, THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/your-money/student-loans-income-repayment.html
(discussing the unmet potential of the income-based repayment plans for student loans).
264. See Gregory S. Crespi, Why Are Over 98% of the Applications for Debt Discharge Under
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program Being Denied?, 65 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614123 (overviewing high denial rates and
concluding that the programs’ failures are due to inattention by the Department of Education).
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The success of any public-backed loan program will depend on
administrative buy-in and attention.
The United States’ home mortgage market provides another story of
caution in creating government-backed auto loan options. For decades,
Congress prioritized people’s purchases of houses, creating a federallybacked mortgage market through the establishment of Fannie Mae in the
1930s and Freddie Mac and in the 1970s.265 Initially, this federal intervention
led to a more stable and consumer-friendly mortgage market as compared to
the 1920s. Eventually, though, the benefits of federal intervention did not
inure to prospective homeowners. Instead, the mortgage meltdown, fueled by
subprime loans disproportionately sold to communities of color, contributed
to the 2008 financial collapse.266
Part of the growth in the student loan market is the increasing importance
of higher education.267 The home mortgage market likewise grew because of
the public perception that owning a home is an integral part of the American
dream. Having an automobile is even more imperative than pursuing higher
education or owning a home. One cannot drive their home to work. But one
can live in their car. There are reasons to be skeptical that once implemented,
a government-backed auto loan market will benefit consumers. The benefits
of government intervention of this nature may inure to private lenders,
potentially further catalyzing subprime auto loans. Other ideas for
interventions should be considered with a healthy cynicism about a publicbacked auto loan market in mind.
Alternatively, the government could subsidize the purchase of
automobiles directly by providing people with cash or a cash equivalent. This
intervention also takes as a given that the United States will continue to
elevate driving as the most reliable, by far, means of transportation and that
people will still purchase vehicles themselves. If so, providing people with
some money to purchase automobiles will relieve some from the pressure of
saving for vehicles and will decrease the portion of vehicles’ value they need
to fund with private loans. In a way, this alternative is similar to a public
265. See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/
SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddieMac/Pages/About-Fannie-Mae—-Freddie-Mac.aspx
(last visited May 23, 2020).
266. See Foohey & Martin, supra note 13, at Part III.A (discussing racial inequality in the
mortgage market); CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET, FORECLOSED: MORTGAGE SERVICING AND THE
HIDDEN ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 21 (2009) (discussing how Black
communities were targeted for subprime loans and how the mortgage market collapsed).
267. See Jiménez & Glater, supra note 256, at 140–41; Frank Newport & Brandon Busteed,
Americans Still See College Education As Very Important, GALLUP (Dec. 17, 2013),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/166490/americans-college-education-important.aspx (reporting that
70% of people surveyed indicated a college education is very important); but see Stephanie Marken,
Half in U.S. Now Consider College Education Very Important, GALLUP (Dec. 30, 2019),
https://www.gallup.com/education/272228/half-consider-college-education-important.aspx
(reporting a decrease in perceptions about the importance of college, possibly in reaction to the
increasing costs of higher education).
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health insurance option.268 The government would subsidize automobiles on
the reasoning that affordable driving is essential, like affordable healthcare is
essential. People should not be driven to filing bankruptcy to keep their cars,
just as they should not have to use the bankruptcy system as their medical
insurer of last resort.269 The specifics of the scale and implementation of such
a program is beyond the scope of this Article. Indeed, instead of money, the
program could provide people with cars themselves, effectively turning the
government into a long-term car rental outfit.
At this juncture, it is more important to reflect on the core characteristics
of America’s current “car economy” and how its workings should inform the
auto loan market. The conclusion of this consideration may be that drastically
changing transportation in America is a more cost-expedient and socially
effective solution to problems with the car economy, even if such changes
seem so radical as to be impossible. Subsidizing cars likely would put more
cars on the road, which would affect the environment,270 and could backfire
by allowing lenders’ power to coalesce even more. It also goes against current
notions of safety and urban planning. 271 Instead, the past decade’s rapid
increase in auto debt outstanding and delinquencies presents a moment to
rethink public transportation across America. That moment is even more
urgent now as the United States recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic’s
economic effects.
CONCLUSION
America is both a country of cars and a country that embraces
technological innovation. The auto industry understands that people need
cars and the promise of fintech to deliver cars and loans for those vehicles.
Although auto dealers and lenders will argue that fintech innovations benefit
consumers, an analysis of the auto market warns that people will continue to
lose ground against dealers and lenders. The essential nature of cars feeds, in

268. See Margot Sanger-Katz, The Difference Between a ‘Public Option’ and ‘Medicare for All’?
Let’s Define Our Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/upshot/
medicare-for-all-health-terms-sanders.html (discussing federally subsidized health care options).
269. See David U. Himmelstein, Robert M. Lawless, Deborah Thorne, Pamela Foohey, & Steffie
Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy: Still Common Despite the Affordable Care Act, 109 AJPH 431
(2019) (reporting that almost two-thirds of people who file bankruptcy list a “medical contributor”
to their filings); Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, supra note 208, at 242–43 (reporting that a
majority of people report going without healthcare and health insurance in the years prior to filing
bankruptcy).
270. See History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, U.S. ENVIR.
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/transportation-air-pollution-and-climate-change/
accomplishments-and-success-air-pollution-transportation (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (discussing
the history of poor air quality from vehicle emissions).
271. See Kea Wilson, Ten Simple Policies to Subtract Cars From Our Streets, STREETSBLOG
USA (Feb. 24, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/02/24/ten-simple-policies-to-subtract-carsfrom-our-streets/ (noting how deaths in the United States are tied to motor vehicles); supra note 3.
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significant part, people’s increasing powerlessness in the auto loan market,
and must inform policies for restoring the balance of power in the market.
Many people now must take on a significant amount of debt to purchase
something that is critical to their lives and livelihoods. That debt is unlike
any other consumer debt in its structure, which allows creditors to easily seize
collateral, and in its lack of regulation. Given that automobiles have
transformed into part of America’s infrastructure, it almost certainly is too
late to implement marginal changes to the existing private auto loan market
to create a more level playing field. Instead, it may be the time to decide that
people should not have to take on excessive debt for something that
governments’ accumulated decisions have forced most of them to purchase,
and to enact programs that bring automobiles more squarely within
America’s public infrastructure.
Alternatively, federal, state, and local governments could allocate funds
to building a different public infrastructure whereby cars are not as essential.
These changes speak to even larger decisions about the nature of shorterdistance travel, environmental sustainability, and overall quality of life in
America. Given that the auto market continues to shift power away from
people in favor of companies and banks, now may be the time to turn more
intently to that larger discussion.

